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After Johnson Controls 
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INTRODUCTION 
When hazards in the workplace threaten the health of fetuses carried 
by female workers, an employer has two options. It can comply with state 
tort law, or it can comply with federal anti-discrimination law. The 
quandary that employers face in the wake of the Supreme Court's 
decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 1 is that 
they cannot comply with both laws at once. 
In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court struck down a fetal 
protection policy that excluded all fertile women from working in a 
battery manufacturing plant.2 Despite fetal hazards posed by airborne 
lead in the plant, the Court concluded that Johnson Controls' policy 
discriminated against women in violation of federal law.3 The Court held 
that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 4 particularly the 1978 
amendment to that title known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
("PDA"),5 preserves the employee's autonomy to decide for herself 
whether she wishes to work in a hazardous environment, regardless of the 
employer's concern about fetal health.6 
In striking down Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy, the 
Supreme Court essentially ruled that the worker's interest in employment 
and autonomy7 takes precedence over the countervailing interest offered 
I 111 s. Ct. 1196 (1991). 
1 !d. at 1209-10. All references in this Article to "fetal protection policies" denote gender-
specific policies that exclude women, but not men, based on the women•s potential to become 
pregnant. 
3 Jd. at 1199-208. 
• Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (1981)). 
s Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 
u.s.c. § 2000e(k) (1981)). 
• 111 S. Ct. at 1207. The essence of the PDA in this regard is that, for purposes of Title VII, 
forbidden sex discrimination is defined to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and 
related conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). Under the PDA, then, a woman capable of 
performing a particular job cannot be excluded from that job on the ground that she is pregnant or 
capable of becoming pregnant, any more than she can be excluded based on her sex per se. 
7 Professor Kim Dayton has argued that 
[b ]y framing the fetal protection issue as one of conflicting rights-between the mother and 
the fetus-advocates of the concept of fetal protection successfully have created an 
analytical framework that invites a resolution of the alleged conflict in favor of fetal 
protection, even if that means denying the mother job opportunities or even her freedom. 
Kim Dayton, Patriarchy, Paternalism and the Masks of "Fetal Protection," 2 KAN. J.L. & PuB. 
PoL•Y 25, 28 (1992) (citing Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation 
of Pregnancy, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 1325, 1335 (1990)). Fertile women who are excluded from jobs 
under a policy as broad as the one in Johnson Controls may have absolutely no intention of 
becoming pregnant, and consequently, may be unconcerned about fetal hazards. Even those women 
who intend to procreate or who are already pregnant may find that it is in the family's best interest 
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by Johnson Controls in defense of its policy-the well-being of future 
generations.8 The question that remains open is whether the dominance of the 
worker's interest is absolute, regardless of what particular interest inspires the 
employer to exclude women, or whether interests other than those relied 
upon in Johnson Controls may sometimes override the interest of the 
employee. If such overriding is possible, then fetal protection plans are 
defensible under appropriate circumstances, even though the Johnson Controls 
case established that the employer's narrow, altruistic interest in the welfare 
of future generations cannot support such a defense.9 If such overriding is not 
possible, then employers must include eligible women in their workforce, 
regardless of what ramifications the hazards present may threaten.10 
to take extra precautions and remain in the higher-paying, albeit riskier, position rather than to accept 
a safer position at a pay level insufficient to provide for their families. 
To the extent that fetal protection policies focus on women's reproductive capacities to the 
exclusion of their work capacities, such policies arguably relegate women to the "one-dimensional" 
role of''vessel and nurturer for the next generation" which Title VII was intended to correct. Wendy 
W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with 
Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 653 (1981). 
1 See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., con~urring); Maria A. Longi, 
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Can Science Ever Justify Gender Discrimina-
tion?, 19 N. KY. L. REv. 425, 445-46 (1992) (discussing the assignment of responsibility for fetal 
protection in the workplace). Johnson Controls offered no rationale for its policy other than the 
altruistic interest in the health of future generations. See infra note 18. Despite the professed concern 
for the well-being of future generations, commentators suggest that employers' true motivation in 
adopting fetal protection policies is to keep women either out of the workplace or in the lower-
ranking, lower-paying jobs that women have traditionally occupied. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, From 
Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219, 1240 (1986). The fact 
that employers also tend not to be concerned about the fetal hazards in other occupations, such as 
nursing and secretarial work, that have traditionally employed women anyway, while expressing 
concern for hazards to fetuses of women holding traditionally male-occupied positions, suggests to 
many that impermissible bias is at work See id. at 1237-41 (concluding that employers tend to 
exclude all fertile women from hazardous jobs where the work force is predominantly male, but only 
pregnant women where the work force is predominantly female); Williams, supra note 7, at 649 
(finding that women are more likely to be excluded from male dominated jobs even though males 
and females are both vulnerable to the toxins present); cf. Becker, supra, at 1225 (finding that state 
protective legislation excluded women only from occupations in which they were deemed 
unimportant); Hannah A. Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The 
Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to ntle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA 
L. REv. 63, 81 (1980) (recognizing that the legislative histozy ofPDA "is replete with documentation 
of employer use of women's childbearing capacity as an excuse for not hiring women ••. despite the 
illegality of such conduct under Title VII''). Such bias is also suggested by the fact that employers 
tend to adopt fetal protection policies that exclude women because of certain toxins, but ignore 
evidence that the same toxins harm male reproduction. See Williams, supra, at 655-61. In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that Johnson Controls' battery-manufacturing employees consisted 
exclusively of males before the passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. Johnson Controls, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1199. 
'Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208. 
1° Critics of the Johnson Controls decision consider it a threat to fetal well-being and to the 
financial interests of businesses that will be liable in tort for fetal injuries. See Jerry J. Jasinowski, 
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As a result of the Johnson Controls decision, employers are left 
fearful of the no-win situation described above. An employer that chooses 
to comply with the federal law announced in Johnson Controls by 
admitting women to a hazardous workplace risks liability under state tort 
law for fetal harm.11 On the other hand, an employer that chooses to 
avoid tort liability by excluding women from the workplace risks liability 
under Title VII. 
A third possibility is that some employers will never face the 
envisioned quandary because the threat of tort liability simply will never 
materialize. Any of several factors could eliminate the prospect of 
employer tort liability for fetal harm. Employers may, for example, be 
found to enjoy workers' compensation immunity for injuries sustained by 
fetuses while the fetuses are "part of" employees who are themselves 
constrained by workers' compensation innnunity.12 In the alternative, 
employers may avoid tort liability by entering into contracts of indemnity 
with female workers, or by using some other measure to ensure that the 
women who elect to expose their fetuses to workplace hazards, and not 
Protect Employers from Irrational Laws, USA ToDAY, Mar. 25, 1991, at A23 (criticizing Johnson 
Controls as subjecting employers to inational requirements); Lawrence Postol & Mary Adelman, 
Protecting Progeny and Pockerbooks, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1991, at 37 (discussing alternatives 
available to businesses in the wake of Johnson Controls, such as moving their operations to other 
countries, and noting the threat to fetuses); see also Bamara R. Gnunet, Fertile Women May Now 
Apply: Fetal Protection Policies After Johnson Controls, 2 RisK: IssuES HEALTii & SAFETY 261 
(1991) (discussing options available to respond to fetal injury). 
11 Disagreement exists regarding the existence of a fetal tort liability threaL Compare Johnson 
Controls, 111 S. CL at 1208 (arguing that employers ~hould not be liable for fetal hann absent 
employer negligence) with id. at 1210-11 (White, J., concuning) (arguing that employers may be held 
liable in strict liability). All states presently recognize that children bom alive have a tort cause of 
action against third parties for prenatal injuries. Id. at 1211 (White, J., concuning) (citing W. PAGE 
KEEToN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984)); see 
Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. 1371, 1372-73 (W.O. Va. 1975) (holding that the Virginia Supreme 
Court would allow a tort action by a child who has suffered prenatal injuries in light of the fact that 
almost all American jurisdictions faced with the issue have pennitted such suits), cited in Junius C. 
McElveen, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, 20 FORUM 547, 563 (1985). Some jurisdictions 
also recognize a cause of action for pre-conception torts. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1211 
(White, 1., concuning) (citing 3 FOWLER V.liARPER ET AL., LAw OF TORTS § 18.3, at 677-78 n.15 
(2d ed. 1986)); see also James W. Brown, Comment, UA W v. Johnson Controls: Gender 
Discrimination in the Fetotoxic Workplace, 44 RuroERS L. REv. 479, 520 (1992} (recognizing the 
reality of the risk of fetal tort claims being brought against companies like Johnson Controls). But 
cf. Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (1986) (refusing to recognize a 
cause of action for chromosomal damage occuning prior to child's conception), affd, 511 N.Y.S.2d 
807 (1987). 
1z But see Cushing v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730 (La. CLApp. 1989) (finding that 
worlcers' compensation immunity against the mother's claims did not bar a child's claim for prenatal 
injuries caused by an accident in the mother's workplace), cert. denied, 556 So. 2d 1281 (La. 1990). 
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the employers, will foot the bill for resultant injuries.13 There is also the 
possibility that employers will avoid the quandary as a result of the 
enactment of federal or state legislation that some commentators have 
advocated.14 Thus, despite the outcry of employers in the wake of 
Johnson Controls, some employers may never confront the dilemma in 
question. 
Those employers that do confront the dilemma have two potential 
escape routes. The employer that elects to comply with federal law will 
invoke the doctrine of federal preemption as a defense to the fetal tort 
suit.15 This employer will argue that conflicts between the federal law 
and the state law render the state law void. The employer that elects 
instead to exclude women in apparent violation of Johnson Controls in 
order to avoid catastrophic fetal tort liability will invoke the statutocy 
bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense.16 This employer 
will argue that the prohibitive costs of tort liability render infertility an 
essential qualification for female employees in the hazardous work-
place.17 Although both of these escape routes elicited Supreme Court 
commentary in Johnson Controls, neither was actually presented by the 
facts of the case.18 Thus, the Court's comments on both are arguably 
dicta. 
This Article analyzes the employer's prospects for escaping its fetal 
injury quandary by means of either the BFOQ defense or federal 
preemption. After a brief explanation of Title VII doctrine governing 
employer fetal protection policies, the Article assesses the likelihood that 
u See Postol & Adelman, supra note 10, at 37. Many employees, of course, would not have the 
personal financial resources to cover such indemnification. The contract of indemnification would 
selVe to caution such parents of the potential threats to fetuses that workplace toxins pose and would 
selVe as a disincentive for women planning procreation to enter hazardous work environments. It 
would also serve as a disincentive to parent-initiated lawsuits on behalf of the damaged offspring. 
14 Some writers have advocated legislative action to ensure that employers that comply with 
Johnson Controls will not be held liable in tort for fetal harm. See. e.g., Vindicating Women's Job 
Rights, CHI. TRJB., March 24, 1991, § 4, at 2; Women Workers and 'Benign' Bias, CHRISTIAN Sci. 
MONITOR, March 25, 1991, at 20. 
J$ See infra text accompanying notes 54-149 (discussing the federal preemption doctrine). 
" The BFOQ provision of Title VII excuses discrimination if the employer discriminates "on 
the basis of [the employee's] religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion, 
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 150-215 (discussing the availability of BFOQ in fetal protection cases). 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 150-215. 
11 See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207-10 (1991); 
id. at 1210-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Johnson Controls, the 
company's only argument was based on the quite narrow defense of the employer's own altruistic 
interest in fetal health. See id. at 1207-08. Notably absent from the defendant's case were financial 
justifications, such as avoidance of tort liability. !d. at 1209. 
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either, or both, of these escape routes will be available to employers 
confronted with the problem of fetal hazards in the workplace. 19 The 
Article concludes that the BFOQ is, in theory, a more promising escape 
mechanism than federal preemption. As a result, employers facing 
ruinous tort liability may sometimes fare best by excluding women in 
violation of Johnson Controls, and relying on the BFOQ defense.20 The 
Article further concludes that any BFOQ predicated upon the potential 
cost of fetal tort liability should be confmed to situations in which the 
costs of such liability will be ruinous to the employer. 
I. JOHNSON CONTROLS 
A. Historical Context and Analytical Methodology 
The major debate in fetal protection cases prior to the Johnson 
Controls decision centered on the issue of which Title VII analytical 
methodology should govern cases challenging fetal protection plans. Title 
VII provided courts with two methodologies to choose from: disparate 
treatment (for intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (for neutral 
practices or policies with statistically adverse effects on women as a 
group).21 A court's choice of methodology was significant because, under 
Title VII, the court's decision of whether to analyze the case as either 
disparate treatment or disparate impact determined which defense an 
employer could invoke.22 As explained below, the disparate impact 
" This Article assumes that the employer under discussion has done all within its power to make 
the worl<place safe and is involved in a business that simply cannot rid itself of fetal hazards. An 
employer that has not taken available precautions certainly should not succeed in defending its 
exclusion of women to protect their fetuses. 
10 This conclusion would traditionally have been reinforced by the fact that fetal tort damages 
are more likely to be of astronomical proportions than are Title VII damages. Under the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act, however, the availability of punitive damages for intentional violations ofTitle VII means 
that employers who knowingly violate Title VII. as construed in Johnson Controls, may face equally 
large damages awards. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1072-73 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. § 198la(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)). 
21 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) 
(distinguishing between treatment and impact cases). For application of the two methodologies, see 
McDonnell Douglas Co1.p. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (applying disparate treatment 
analysis in a facial discrimination case) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971) 
(applying disparate impact analysis when there is no proof of discriminatory pmpose). 
In addition to forbidding employment discrimination based on sex, Title VII forbids 
discrimination based on race, color, religion and national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). 
Because this Article pertains to sex discrimination, it describes the operation of Title VII in terms 
of sex. 
22 See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discriminatian 
Law Revisited: &me Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1359, 1395-403 
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defendant could prevail by persuading the court that the practice was 
warranted by "business necessity,"23 whereas the disparate treatment 
defendant had to prove the elements of the more stringent BFOQ 
defense.24 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls, employers 
defending fetal protection plans advocated impact analysis because the 
business necessity defense is broader and easier to prove than the BFOQ 
defense.25 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, describes the 
employer's business necessity burden in impact analysis as that of 
"demonstrat[ing] that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity.''26 The more 
stringent BFOQ defense, on the other hand, has been described as 
requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the "essence of the business 
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex 
exclusively. "27 
(1990). 
23 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 1990). Unlike the BFOQ, which is a statutory defense, 
the recently enacted business necessity defense was originally the product of Supreme Court decision. 
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (when neutral employer practices are 
discriminatory in operation, the touchstone is business necessity). 
2
' See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding that the BFOQ is the 
only available defense in intentional discrimination cases); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981) 
(providing for the BFOQ defense); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1988) (construing BFOQ nanowly); 
Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to 
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 5, 11 (1991) (stating that the "BFOQ defense is, 
of necessity, quite narrow[,] •.. established only when a sex-based distinction is necessary to actual 
job perfonnance') (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334, 336 (1977), and International 
Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting), 
rev'd, 111 S. CL 1196 (1991)); see infra note 25. Professor Befort classifies "[t]he relatively few 
[judicially recognized] BFOQs ••• into three categories: authenticity, privacy, and safety." Id. at 17. 
The defense is further constricted by virtue of its unavailability in cases alleging race discrimination. 
See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F. 2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989). Under the tenns of Title Vll, 
the BFOQ requires the defendant to persuade the court that the exclusion of women is ''reasonably 
necessary to the nonnal operation of [the] particular business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981), 
quoted in Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985). 
2S See Wright v. Olin Coxp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185 n.21 (4th Cir. 1982) {noting that employers 
restricted to the BEOQ to defend fetal protection plans, rather than the business necessity defense, 
would have no effective defense at all); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 491 (describing the 
differences between business necessity and BFOQ). Such business reasons can be far broader than 
the job perfonnance question under the BFOQ. See Befort, supra note 24, at 11; Mark S. Brodin, 
Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 318 (1987); cf. id. at 
358 (advocating a narrowing of the business necessity defense by arguing that BFOQ and business 
necessity defenses should be substantially similar). 
u 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1990); see supra note 23. 
n Diaz v. Pan Am. World Aitways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 
(1971), quoted in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); see also Torres v. Wisconsin 
Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1530 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that BFOQ must be 
reasonably necessary to furthering an objective that is the essence of the business), cert. denied, 489 
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Rather than choose between these two methodologies, courts prior to 
Johnson Controls strained to combine the two approaches, creating a 
hybrid analysis that tended to preserve the challenged fetal protection 
measures.28 The hybrid analysis allowed employers to avoid the onerous 
task of proving the elements of the BFOQ. Instead, employers had only 
to demonstrate that fetal hazards were, indeed, transmitted by women and 
not by men. The advantage that this gave to employers disappeared with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls. 
B. Johnson Controls' Fetal Protection Policy 
Johnson Controls manufactures batteries using a process that exposes 
plant employees to lead. 29 Because of that exposure and the reality that 
many pregnancies are unplanned, the company adopted a fetal protection 
policy that excluded all fertile women from portions of the plant in which 
tests had revealed excessive lead levels.30 The company's fetal protection 
policy applied to female applicants for positions and to any female 
U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1992) (explaining the 
elements of BFOQ defense). 
21 The two major opinions on the subject were Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 
(11th Cir. 1984) and Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). 
In Hayes, a hospital fired a pregnant x-ray technician to protect her fetus from radiation. 726 
F.2d at 1546. Meshing impact and treatment analysis, the Hayes court pennitted the hospital to rebut 
what the court tenned the "presumption that [an] ••. employer's policy which by its tenns applies 
only to women or pregnant women is facially discriminatocy" by showing that the ''policy is neutral 
in the sense that it effectively and equally protects the offspring of all employees." !d. at 1552. But 
see infra note 44 (discussing the irony of this decision). Similarly, in Wright, the Fourth Circuit held 
that the employer was entitled to assert the business necessity defense, rather than being required to 
assert the BFOQ defense, in a suit challenging the employer's "fetal vulnerability'' program. 697 F.2d 
at 1185-86 n.21. The hybrid analysis found acceptance at the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission [hereinafter EEOC], which patterned guidelines on the Wright-Hayes analysis, only to 
have the guidelines dismantled when the Supreme Court decided Johnson Controls. See EEOC: IJ 
Policy Guidance on Supreme Court's Johnson Controls Decision, 8 Lab. Rei. Rep. (BNA) 405:6941, 
6943 (June 28, 1991). 
~Lead forms a crucial component of batteries. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988), affd en bane, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 
S. Ct. 1196 (1991). 
30 Johnsan Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1199-200. These levels corresponded to the Centers for 
Disease Control's standards for children. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876 n.7. The levels were 
lower than OSHA employee exposure standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c)(l), (k:XI)(i)(D) (1992); 
886 F.2d at 871. Agreeing with the district court, the court of appeals found "overwhelming evidence 
in [the} record establish[ing} that an unborn child's exposure to lead creates a substantial health risk 
involving a danger of permanent harm." /d. at 883. See generally M. Chris Floyd, Case Note, Putting 
the Teeth Back into the BFOQ Requirement of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act: 
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 413, 427 (1992) (discussing 
additional lead hazards). Johnson Controls' policy presumed that a woman was fertile unless she 
could prove otherwise with medical documentation. 111 S. Ct. at 1200. 
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employee who sought transfer to a lead-exposed position, regardless of 
the intentions of the applicant or employee regarding procreation. 31 
C. The Lower Courts 
A group of employees affected by this policy and a labor union brought 
a class action in federal district court to challenge the policy as sex discrimi-
nation wtder Title Vll.32 Applying the hybrid impact/treatment analysis, the 
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.33 The hybrid 
analysis required this result because there was substantial expert opinion 
recognizing a significant risk to the unborn from maternal lead exposure 
at the levels present in the defendant's workplace.34 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit accepted this hybrid analysis35 and 
found in addition that the facts of the case also supported the BFOQ 
defense.36 For BFOQ purposes, the appellate court found the essence of 
31 Thus, Johnson Controls' policy was broad enough to exclude all fertile women, rather than 
excluding only those women who were pregnant or planning pregnancies. The company's rationales 
for the breadth of their policy were that lead could hann the fetus between conception and discovery 
of the pregnancy, that reduction of blood lead levels once the pregnancy was detected could take a 
significant period of time, and that pregnancies are frequently unplanned. 886 F.2d at 878, 882. 
u Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. Union plaintiffs were the International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America [hereinafter UAW], and 
several UAW local unions. 886 F.2d at 874. 
31 Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 318. 
,.. Id. at 315. The district court followed Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th 
Cir. 1984), finding disparate impact analysis appropriate since the established threat of harm through 
the mother effectively rebutted a presumption of facial discrimination. 680 F. Supp. at 316. Having 
found the presumption rebutted, the court necessarily found that, under Hayes, the defendant had met 
the requirements of the business neeessity defense. Jd. For a discussion of Hayes, see supra note 28. 
15 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 884-86 (discussing and adOpting hybrid analysis). The appellate 
court concluded that it was irrelevant whether a challenged fetal protection policy amounted to 
intentional discrimination {thus calling for disparate treatment analysis) or merely resulted in a 
disparate impact (thus calling for impact analysis). Id. at 886-87. In either event, the business 
necessity defense would be available. · 
All of the dissenting judges argued that the case was strictly disparate treatment, and that the 
only available defense was BFOQ. See id. at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); id. at 904 (Posner, J., 
dissenting); id. at 909 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The dissenters differed, however, on the question 
of whether the BFOQ might ever successfully defend a fetal protection case. Their disagreement 
centered on the issue of whether an employer's goal of protecting fetuses can qualifY as the essence 
of the employer's business, or whether the BFOQ is limited to considerations of the employee's ability 
to perfonn the functions of the job, disregarding any effect on fetal health. Compare id. at 904 
(Posner, J., dissenting) and id. at 901 {Cudahy, J., dissenting) with id. at 912 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting). The appellate court's BFOQ analysis was, in effect, an alternative rationale that would 
support its holding even if the business necessity defense turned out to be unavailable in such cases. 
!d. at 893. 
u !d. at 893 {concluding that Johnson Controls' policy should be upheld as a BFOQ). 
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Johnson Controls' business to include the safe manufacture ofbatteries.37 
Thus, the goal of protecting fetuses was part of the essence of defen-
dant's, and probably every, business.38 The Seventh Circuit also found 
that Johnson Controls had demonstrated that the absolute exclusion of 
fertile women was necessary to meet this essential fetal protection 
goal.39 
D. Supreme Court Resolution 
The Supreme Court voted unanimously to permit women to decide 
for themselves whether to risk the fetal hazards present in Johnson 
Controls' battery plant.40 The Court first rejected the hybrid approach 
that had permitted employers to rely on the business necessity 
defense.41 Instead, the Court concluded that fetal protection plans 
)
7 Id. at 896. This decision represented a departure from traditional BFOQ doctrine, which tended 
to limit the defense to matters pertaining to the worker's ability to perform the job. See Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977). 
11 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 896-97; see supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining 
BFOQ essence requirement). This conclusion highlights a point of contention with respect to 
"business essence." How many "essences" can a business have? If the "essence" of Johnson Controls' 
business is not just battery manufacture, but battery manufacture without damage to the unborn, then 
what other goals might .also be deemed the "essence" of the business? Can we, for example, include 
in the essence of a company's business the goals of not banning the environment, of not adding to 
unemployment in times of national economic recession, of not inflaming international relations in 
volatile situations, and of earning enough money to stay in business? Or, is essence simply the part 
of the business activities or production that causes people to tum their money over to the business? 
"Id. at 897-99. The court explained that women could not be permitted to ''brush off" 
environmental threats to the fetus the way they could ignore similar threats to their own health. The 
court found support in the fact that the law sometimes forbids parents from refusing blood 
transfusions for their children, even though the parents would be permitted to refuse such treatment 
for themselves. Id. at 897. In addition, the court recognized that society is legitimately concerned with 
risks to unborn children because society may ultimately be responsible for meeting the special needs 
of children damaged by lead. I d. It is odd that the court found support for distinguishing between the 
right to harm one's self and the absence of a right to harm one's fetus in the fact that society may be 
burdened with the costs of damage to the fetus. Society so frequently ends up paying for damage that 
adults inflict on themselves, as well . 
.a Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199, 1210. Shortly after the Supreme Court struck down 
Johnson Controls' policy, women began to apply for the jobs involving lead exposure from which 
the policy had excluded them. See Florence Estes, Supreme Friends: The Stars of the Fetal Case 
Stood Their Ground-Together, CHI. Trus., Apr. 28, 1991, § 6, at 3. Supporters of the Johnson 
Controls decision term it "a resounding victoty for women's and workers' rights." Floyd, supra note 
30, at 413 (quoting Katy L. Moss, A Victory for Choice, 13 NAT'L L.J., April 8, 1991, at 13). 
Whether for or against the decision, commentators tend to view the case as having cleared the path 
to the major undertaking of making the workplace safe for all workers, regardless of sex, and free 
of hazards that could harm the offspring of workers whether through fathers or mothers. See Ellen 
Goodman, Equal But Not Saft, BosroN GLOBE, Mar. 24, 1991, at A23; Ruth Rosen, What Feminist 
Victory in the Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at A17. 
•• Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct at 1203. 
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constitute intentional, overt, sex discrimination that calls for disparate 
treatment, not disparate impact, analysis.42 The Court explained that 
such plans' open exclusion of women and not men43 renders the plans 
antithetical to disparate impact, which seeks to remedy discriminatory 
effects of facially neutral practices.44 
Because it was subject to the disparate treatment approach, 
Johnson Controls' plan could survive challenge only if Johnson 
Controls could establish the BFOQ defense. Inasmuch as Johnson 
Controls had not shown that infertility constituted a BFOQ for all 
female employees, the Court concluded that Johnson Controls had 
failed to prove the only defense available.4s Having agreed on these 
two particulars, however, the justices parted company. 
'
2 /d. at 1202-04. The Court based its characterization of the discrimination as intentional and 
overt on the fact that under Johnson Controls' policy, "[f]ertile men, but not fertile women, were 
given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job." /d. at 
1202. In the Title VII context, to say the employer intentionally discriminates means simply that the 
employer makes an employment decision based on the sex of the plaintiff. The employer's action 
need not be motivated by any malice toward the plaintiff or toward women generally, but only by 
the simple fact of the plaintiffs sex. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987). 
As discussed supra note 6, discrimination based on an employee's ability to become pregnant is the 
same thing as discrimination based on sex. 
'' Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1202-04 (analyzing fetal protection plans under disparate 
treatment analysis because such plans amount to facial discrimination). Even without the PDA, 
traditional Title VII doctrine would suggest that fetal protection policies are facially discriminatory. 
The Supreme Court has established that employers that exclude only a subset of women, rather than 
all women, are nevertheless guilty of discrimination. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co1p., 400 U.S. 542, 
544 (1971) (holding that a policy of hiring men, but not women, with preschool-age children violates 
Title VII). As long as a policy excludes fertile women, and not fertile men, then the policy constitutes 
overt sex discrimination. The enactment of the PDA simply confinns that such policies discriminate 
on their face. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). 
" Because fetal protection measures constitute facial discrimination, and thus clearly are subject 
to disparate treatment analysis, the ruling in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 P.2d 1543 (11th 
Cir. 1984), was particularly ironic. See supra note 28. The Hayes court permitted the defendant to 
avoid treatment analysis with a mere showing that the policy, though facially discriminatory, had a 
"neutral impact" on the offspring of men and women. Hayes, 126 P.2d at 1548. In both Hayes and 
Wright v. Olio Co1p., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), the disparate impact analysis was distorted to 
accommodate fetal protection because the courts believed that disparate treatment analysis would yield 
unfair decisions for the plaintiffs. See supra notes 25 & 28. The courts concluded that the defendants 
would fail on a straight BPOQ defense because the defendants could not prove that pregnancy or 
fertility interfered with women's ability to perform their work. See Hayes, 126 P.2d at 1542; Wright, 
697 F.2d at 1185. 
"'Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207. The Court explained that safety offetuses could support 
a BPOQ only if fetal safety were "indispensable to the particular business at issue" in the same way 
that customer safety is indispensable to a business. /d. at 1205. Johnson Controls, moreover, could-
not have argued that the fetus constituted part of the employee so that employee safety would require 
exclusion because an employee may usually elect to waive her own interest in working in a hazard-
free environment. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977). 
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Although a unanimous decision, Johnson Controls was unanimous 
only on the narrow facts of the case; that is, all of the justices agreed 
that a fetal protection plan predicated on an employer's interest in 
fetal health violated Title VII.46 The main points of disagreement 
among the justices concerned where the decision left employers with 
respect to the fetal injury quandary and the two potential escape 
routes. First, the justices disagreed on whether employers forced by 
federal law to expose fertile women to unavoidable fetal hazards 
could invoke the doctrine of federal preemption in order to escape 
state tort liability to the fetus.47 Second, the justices differed on 
whether the prospect of fetal tort liability could support a Title VII 
BFOQ even though the altruistic interest in fetal health could 
not.48 
The Court's failure to agree is of no consequence, of course, if the 
majority's holding can be considered to have encompassed decisions 
on these issues. Although the facts of the case presented neither the 
preemption issue nor the cost BFOQ issue, Justice Blackmun's opinion 
for the majority made predictions on both.49 Justice Blackmun 
predicted that Title VII would preempt tort law, so that employers 
that complied with the Johnson Controls holding would not be liable 
for fetal injury.50 He also predicted that employers that violate 
.ct 111 S. Ct. at 1209-10; id. at 1214-15 (White J., concurring); id. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
•
7 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
•• Although some commentators suggest that the Court in Johnson Controls struck down all fetal 
protection plans, see, e.g., Women Workers ond Benign Bias, CHRisriAN SCI. MoNITOR, Mar. 25, 
1991, at 20, in fact, Justice Blackmun stated that the issue of cost justification, as opposed to fetal 
health justifications, was not before the Court, 111 S. Ct. at 1209; see also id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging that Johnson Controls did not assert a cost-based BFOQ). See supra note 
8 and accompanying text. 
" The majority's statements regarding preemption are more clearly dicta than are its statements 
on the BFOQ. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208, 1209; id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring); id. 
at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Befort, supra note 24, at 50 (noting that the "majority [in 
Johnson Controls] suggested, although without deciding, that compliance with Title VII may preempt 
liability under state tort Jaws'). Blaclamm's statement regarding preemption was clearly dicta since 
Johnson Controls was a Title VII suit and, therefore, preemption was not even a potential defense. 
50 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208-09 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132 (1963)). Justice Blackmun sunnised that even if Title VII does not preempt state tort 
law, companies would not be at risk of liability for fetal injuries as long as the companies gave 
adequate warnings and were not negligent. !d. at 1208. Justice Blackmun did not discuss state law that 
imposes strict liability, although Justice White opined that strict liability was a possibility. !d. at 1211 
{White, J., concurring) (citing REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 cmt. b (1979)). But see 
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 914 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("(S]o far as I know no child has recovered a judgment on account of 
parents' occupational exposure to lead.'); Joanne 1. Ervin, Title VII: Misapplication of the Business 
Necessity Defense, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 241, 280-84 (1990) (arguing that the possibility of fetal 
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Johnson Controls in order to avert fetal injuries will be able to predicate 
a BFOQ defense on the need to avoid the costs of tort liability. 51 Justice 
Blackmun's statements, whether or not they are dicta, are likely to guide 
lower courts confronting these issues.52 In fact, they have already led 
some commentators to conclude that the BFOQ is entirely unavailable in 
the fetal protection context.53 Nevertheless, as explained below, the 
BFOQ defense may sometimes hold more promise for employers than the 
federal preemption doctrine. 
II. WHETHER TITLE VIT SHOULD PREEMPT 
STATE FETAL TORT LAW 
When state law and federal law conflict, 54 creating no-win situations 
for those governed by both laws, the state law becomes a prime target for 
tort liability is remote). 
"
1 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. 
n The concurring justices took issue with both of these conclusions. Justice White, joined by 
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, believed that Johnson Controls might be able to show 
that it would be liable in tort to the injured offspring of female employees, even if such liability 
could be predicated only on negligence, rather than strict liability. !d. at 1211 (White, J., concurring). 
In addition, Justice White argued that warnings to the parents could not absolve the employer of tort 
liability to the offspring. Id. The concurring justices also argued that Title VII would not preempt 
the state tort laws giving rise to such liability. Justice Scalia suggested that the Title VII BFOQ 
defense may be intended to accommodate state tort law. !d. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Under 
this view, rather than Title VII preempting state tort liability, the BFOQ defense would become 
operative in the face of such liability. !d. Title VII, rather than tort law, would give way. [d. Both 
Justice White and Justice Scalia concurred in the result of the case because Johnson Controls had 
not offered a cost-justification defense. Id. at 1214-15 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
"
1 See, e.g., Postol & Adelman, supra note 10, at 37; see supra note 48. The case is likely to guide 
courts on both the BFOQ and the preemption issue. Thus, without deciding the issue, the Johnson 
Controls case plants a seed that may grow to full-blown preemption when the issue is ripe. Regardless 
of what result a full analysis under traditional preemption doctrine would yield, there is now the 
possibility that lower courts will rely on Justice Blackmun's dicta in Johnson Controls as controlling 
the preemption issue. 
~ The term "state law" in preemption analysis encompasses state common law, as well as state 
statutes and local laws of various sorts. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 
(1992); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citing City 
ofBurbank v. Lockheed AirTenninal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Cmp., 
464 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1984); Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public 
Policy, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 8\'RACUSE L. REv. 897, 914 (1988). In addition, 
"federal law," as used in preemption discussion, encompasses not only federal statutory law, but also 
federal regulations. See Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. at 713 (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. 
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984)); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-
54 (1982); see also United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961) (finding that federal 
regulatory scheme at issue was "meant to displace inconsistent state law"). 
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the federal preemption doctrine.55 Federal law that preempts state law 
effectively renders the state law inoperative. 56 If an employer complies 
with the federal law requiring inclusion of women in a workplace that 
contains fetal hazards, and if state law renders the employer liable for 
resultant fetal injwy, the employer can escape tort liability only if the 
federal law preempts the state law.57 As argued below, and despite 
Justice Blackmun's predictions to the contrary, state tort law imposing 
liability for fetal harm may withstand the preemption challenge. 58 
A. Traditional Preemption Doctrine 
In theory at least, the preemption doctrine allows federal law to 
supplant state law only if Congress intends a preemptive effect. 59 Absent 
ss See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992). This 
doctrine effectuates the Supremacy Clause, which provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States wlllch shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority ofthe United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contmy notwithstand-
ing. 
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI., cl. 2. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir.) 
(citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986)), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 
(1989). 
"See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (citing Mazyland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 16-17 (1824). The preemption issue may arise in either of 
two procedural postures. Those challenging the state law (or other exercise of state power) may bring 
a suit seeking an injunction against operation of the allegedly preempted state law. See, e.g., 
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 577, 588-89 (1987) (holding that a 
plaintiff who mounts a facial challenge to state statute must demonstrate that there are no possible 
constructions of the act that would not warrant preemption). In the alternative, the issue may be 
raised as a defense when suit is brought pursuant to the state law alleged to be preempted. See, e.g., 
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 246. 
57 In Johnson Controls, Justice Blackmun relied upon the potential for such preemption when he 
rejected the idea that the BFOQ might be predicated upon tort liability to those who were damaged 
as fetuses. 111 S. Ct. at 1208-09. 
51 Although the preetnption inquity turns on the particular facts of the case, see City of Burbank 
v. Lockheed AirTenninal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); Elaine M. Martin, Note, The Burger Court 
and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1985), 
it is, of course, necessazy to rely on generalities in order to make predictions about the application 
of preemption doctrine to state fetal tort laws. 
51 See Cipollone, 112 S. Cl at 2617 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 
(1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); Gade v. National Solid 
Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2381-82 (1992) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 
471 U.S. 202, 208 (1978) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978))); 
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 
(1986). Intent, of course, must frequently be inferred because Congress does not always give 
deliberative thought to the question of whether a given federal statute should preempt state law. See, 
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some demonstrable evidence of intent, Congress is presumed not to have 
intended such an effect. 60 This presumption against preemption is 
particularly strong where the state regulation is an exercise of the state's 
police powers.61 
There are three avenues by which Congress can be found to have 
intended a preemptive effect. 62 One of these is the rarely employed 
e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733-38 (1949); cf. Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View 
of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. FoRUM 515, 542. But see Paul Wolfson, Preemption and 
Federalism: The Mzssing Link, 16 HAsriNGs CoNsr. L.Q. 69, 87 (1988) (noting that many 
preemption cases are resolved without reference to congressional intent). However, contrary to the 
usual pronouncement regarding congressional intent, congressional intent is irrelevant where there 
is direct conflict between the federal and state laws. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). 
10 See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 
117, 127 (1973) (In preemption analysis, ''the proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both 
statutoxy schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted."') (quoting Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). 
11 See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617; Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources 
Consetvation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151, 157 (1978); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1963) (citations 
omitted). Although some cases suggest that the presumption against preemption of a state's exercise 
of police power operates primarily in the field preemption conteXt, see infra notes 65-68 and 
accompanying text (explaining field preemption), other cases suggest that the presumption applies 
to all types of preemption. Compare Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) 
(finding an overriding presumption for all types of preemption that cOurts should assume ' 'that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress") and Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("'[The} relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when 
there is conflict with a valid federal law."') (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)) with 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (finding, in cases of field preemption, a 
presumption in favor of state laws in areas traditionally regulated by the $tes). This presumption 
is, in turn, bolstered when the exercise of police power focuses particularly on issues of health and 
safety, and when the state law provides a remedy not duplicative of federal law. See William L. 
Lynch, Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 381 (1978) (recognizing that 
a mechanism within the federal law which provides the same protection as the state law at issue is 
a significant factor in support of preempting the state law) (citations omitted); cf. Burbank v. 
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624, 629-32, 638-39 (1973) (finding preemption of state law 
acceptable where federal law protects the interests in question). 
n E.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987); Michigan Canners & 
Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984). The First 
Circuit has cautioned that while "[t]he different forms of preemption are usually summarized by neat 
citations to familiar Supreme Court Authority. • •• these ready citations list, but do not describe, and 
catalog, but do not define, any real distinctions among the various types of preemption." Palmer v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 1987); see also English v. General Electric Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 86 n.5 (1990) (finding the preemption categories not absolute). But see Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444 (1960) ("Although verbal generalizations do not 
of their own motion decide concrete cases, it is nevertheless within the framework of these basic 
principles that the issue ••• [of preemption] nrust be determined.''); Dion W. Hayes, Note, 
Emasculating State Environmental Enforcement: The Supreme Court's Selective Adoption of the 
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device of express legislative language.63 Congress may expressly 
preempt an entire field of regulatory activity or a specified portion 
thereof. Title VII does not contain such express preemption of state law, 
although it does contain what Justice Scalia has termed "antipre-emption, 
provisions, which are discussed below.64 
The other two methods of finding a congressional intention to 
preempt are by implication. 65 Implied preemption occurs as either "field 
preemption" or "conflict preemption." Federal law implicitly occupies the 
field when it so pervasively regulates an area that there is, in effect, "no 
room for the states to supplement it,"66 or when it regulates an area of 
such dominant federal interest that the states are simply not permitted to 
Preemption Doctrine, 16 WM. & MARY J. ENvn. L. 30, 32, 36 (1991) (noting that although the 
three categories of preemption are not rigidly distinct, insufficient evidence of one type of preemption 
cannot combine with insufficient evidence of another type of preemption to effectuate preemption). 
" See, e.g., Cipollone, 112 S. Cl at 2617 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 
(1977)); see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (discussing ''the scope of 
several provisions of ERISA that speak expressly to the question of pre-emption''). It is unnecessacy 
for Congress to provide statutorily that a piece of federal legislation will preempt conflicting state 
laws because such federal law preempts the state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause, without 
reference to congressional intent underlying the statute. See U.S. CoNsr. art. VI., cl. 2. A finding of 
such actual conflict, then, dispenses with the need to inquire into congressional intent See Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Wolfson, supra note 59, at 88. But 
cf. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 726 
(1991) (recognizing a judicial trend offocusing on constitutional preemption under the Supremacy 
Clause instead of statutory conflict). On the other hand, when preemption is effectuated by agency 
regulation, rather than statute, the Supreme Court has voiced an expectation that the agency "declare 
any intention to pre-empt state law with some specificity." California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite 
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 
471 u.s. 707, 718 (1985)) . 
. " California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 295 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). Such provisions provide either that the statute is not intended to have a preemptive 
effect, or that the scope of any intended preemption is limited in a specified way. See, e.g., Gade v. 
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 (1992) (recognizing limitations on 
preemption in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's savings clause). There are two 
provisions in the 1964 Civil Rights Act that expressly pertain to limitations on preemption. See infra 
notes 72-92 and accompanying text. Congress' enactment of such provisions delineating the 
preemptive effect of its laws has not eliminated the Supreme Court's role of applying preemption 
doctrine to consttue such provisions. See Gade, 112 S. Ct at 238; Guerra, 479 U.S. at 282-90. 
•s See, e.g., Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2383 (citations omitted); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 
485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 141-43. Cf. Jose L. 
Fernandez, The Purpose Test: Shielding State Environmental Statutes from the Sword of Preemption, 
41 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1202, 1208 (1990) ("Labeling preemption as ..• implied does little in 
providing the Court with an analytical tool.''). 
"See, e.g., Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2383 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). 
Throughout the remainder of this Article "field preemption" is used to denote "implied field 
preemption," rather than express field preemption, which is denominated as "express." 
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act within the area. 07 If the federal government is deemed to have 
occupied a given field, then the test of whether federal law in that area 
preempts a particular state law is whether the state law regulates a matter 
already regulated by federal law.68 
The second type of implied preemption, "conflict preemption," 69 is 
the only relevant category for pwposes of the Title VII/fetal tort inquiry. 
Preemptive conflict may take one of two forms. Such conflict occurs 
either when it is physically impossible for one to comply with both 
federal and state law at the same time ("impossibility preemption"), 70 or 
when "state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full 
pwposes and objectives of Congress" ("obstacle preemption"). 71 
" See. e.g., De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)); CityofBwbank v. Lockheed AirTerrninal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); United 
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 380-83 (1961); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1949); cf. 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 143-44 (analyzing whether the maturity of 
avocadoes is an area requiring "exclusive federal regulation.,). This doctrine was originally articulated 
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., in which the Court cited a third categozy of field preemption 
where ''the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of the obligation 
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose [to preclude state regulation]." 331 U.S. at 230-31. One 
sc:holar. has argued that this third categozy has not been successfully used as an independent ground 
for finding field preemption. See Charles B. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: 
California's Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 40 (1979-80) .. 
" Field preemption does not require that there be a conflict between the two laws. See Capital 
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). On the contrary, in deciding whether the 
federal law preempts state law, the Supreme Court looks at the extent to which the state regulation 
has an impact in the area (or field) that Congress has occupied. Some impact on such decision 
making is acceptable. See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 86 (1990) (citing Goodyear 
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1988)). But see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Cotp., 464 
U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given 
field, any state law falling within that field is preempted.") (citations omitted). Cf. Fernandez, supra 
note 65, at 1204 (arguing that "a puxpose-based analysis is as valid ••. as an effects-based test for 
preemption"). 
H See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300; Perzy v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987); CTS Cotp. 
v. Dynamics Cotp., 481 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1987); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248 (citing Florida Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 
U.S. 470, 479-93 (1974); Hines v: Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Wood v. General Motors 
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1112-13 (D. Mass. 1987), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Ronald D. 
Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CoNsr. COMM. 311, 317 (1988). 
70 See Capital Cities Cable Inc., 467 U.S. at 699; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 
U.S. at 142-43. InMcDennott v. Wisconsin, for example, the Court forbade state prosecution ofretail 
merchants for labeling products in a manner required by federal law, but impennissible under state 
law. 228 U.S. 115, 133·34 (1913). Compliance with both laws at once was a physical impossibility. 
[d. at 132-33. See generally Donald P. Rothsc:hild, A Proposed "Tonic" with Florida Lime to 
Celebrate our New Federalism: How to Deal with the ''Headache" of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 829, 842 (1984) (advocating broader use of "dual compliance .. test). This type of conflict has 
also been described as a "prohlbition of dutiful conduct." Lynch, supra note 61, at 366. 
71 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300; California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 
572, 581 (1987) (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248). But see Stein Distrib. Co. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
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Two provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act focus specifically on the 
Act's preemptive scope, and so potentially govern Title VII's impossibi-
lity and obstacle preemption capabilities. One of these is located in Title 
VII itself,72 and the other is in Title XI of the Act.73 There is disagree-
ment among the Justices of the Supreme Court, however, on the question 
of whether Title VII preemption is covered exclusively by the Title VII 
provision or whether the Title XI provision applies as well.74 
B. Purpose and Scope of Sections 708 and 1104 
Section 708 of Title VII and section 1104 of Title XI contain 
preemption "saving clauses"75 that are effectively identical in all but one 
pertinent respect.'6 Both legislatively eliminate the potential for field 
Tobacco & Firearms, 779 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.) (suggesting that the query is whether 
compliance with federal law would obstruct accomplishment of the purposes of state law), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1986). The Supreme Court first articulated the "obstacle" preemption test in 
the case of Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.11 (1941), as a way of generalizing what is 
required for preemption of all sorts. Subsequent courts have sometimes adhered to the Hines 
articulation of this second type of conflict preemption as simply another way of phrasing the field 
and impossibility inquiries. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (citing Hines, 312 
U.S. at 67); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
495 U.S. 956 (1990). In addition to the "obstacle" label, such conflict has been refem:d to variously 
as "impairment," Hoke, supra note 63, at 741 n.257, "hindrance," Lynch, supra note 61, at 369, and 
''frustration," Rothschild, supra note 70, at 857. This Article adheres to the "obstacle" label, 
borrowing from the Hines language. 
n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988). 
n Id. § 2000h-4. 
74 See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. 
75 See generally Lynch, supra note 61, at 365-66 (explaining saving clauses). In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Scalia called these provisions ''antipre-emption" provisions because they seek to 
limit, rather than effectuate, federal preemption of state law. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 295-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
" Section 708 states: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any 
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State 
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or 
pemrit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this 
subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988). 
Section 1104 provides: 
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the 
part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of 
State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as 
invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of 
the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof. 
42 u.s.c. § 2000h-4 (1988). 
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preemption.77 Both preserve the potential for impossibility preemption. 
The difference is that section 1104 of Title XI permits obstacle preemp-
tion, and section 708 of Title VII does not. 78 
The Supreme Court debated the applicability of section 1104 to Title 
VII in California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra. 79 In Guerra, the 
Supreme Court held that Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or 
PDA, did not preempt a California law requiring that employers provide 
certain benefits to pregnant employees. 80 The employer argued that the 
state's pregnancy benefit requirement conflicted with the PDA require-
ment that pregnant workers receive the same treatment as workers 
disabled by conditions other than pregnancy.81 A majority of the Court 
considered this preemption issue under section 1104, as well as under 
section 708.82 
Initially applying an impossibility preemption analysis, the Guerra 
Court concluded that the state law did not require any act that would 
violate the PDA.83 This result followed directly from the Court's 
construction of the PDA. The Court announced that the PDA permits 
employers to provide pregnant workers with benefits superior to those 
provided to workers disabled by conditions other than pregnanqy. 84 Even 
accepting the defendanes argument that the PDA prohibits disparity in 
benefits, the Court concluded that impossibility preemption would not 
apply.85 In the majority's view, the California law simply required 
employers to provide certain minimum benefits to workers disabled by 
pregnancy, but did not impose a maximum limit on what could be given 
to nonpregnant workers.86 Thus, there was nothing to keep employers 
77 Needless to say, by excluding such implied preemption, Congress made clear that it was not 
engaged in express preemption either. 
11 Because Title VII's preemption provision was aimed at preserving state fair employment laws, 
rather than state tort laws, tbexe is a question of whether it should limit preemption of tort laws at 
all. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 282·83. 
"Id. at 281·82. 
10 !d. at 292. 
11 /d. at 278-79. 
az Id. at 282. 
u /d. at 290. 
" /d. at 284. A total of five justices agreed on this point Joining in Justice Marshall's opinion 
for the Court were Justices Brennan, Blackmun and O'Conner. !d. at 273. Justice Stevens agreed on 
this aspect of the Court's opinion. !d. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
u !d. at 290-91. Here, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Marshall's opinion, id. at 295 (Stevens, 
J., concurring), and Justice Scalia found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether conflict 
would exist ifthe PDA imposed a ceiling on pregnancy benefits, id. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
11 ld. at 290-92. The majority was not deterred in this conclusion by the Ifact that the employer 
might en'counter significant cost requirements in the process of elevating the benefit levels of all its 
employees to the benefit level of pregnant workers. This burden did not demonstrate a preemptive 
conflict See id. at 291 (relying on petitioners' concession at oral argument "that compliance with both 
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from providing nonpregnant workers the same level of benefits given to 
pregnant workers. Hence, impossibility preemption would not result. 
Having found that the PDA did not preempt the state law under 
impossibility analysis, the Guerra Court nevertheless went on to apply 
obstacle preemption analysis, as embodied in section 1104.87 The Court's 
analysis on this issue was brief. It simply found that the challenged 
California law had a common purpose with Title VII, and did not stand 
as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes of Title VII. 88 Guerra 
thus assessed both types of conflict preemption and concluded that the 
California statute manifested neither.89 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia echoed the majority's view that 
California law did not require a violation of the PDA, and thus concluded 
that preemption was not a possibility.90 Unlike the majority, however, 
Justice Scalia viewed section 708 as the only preemption provision 
relevant to the question of Title VII's preemptive scope.91 Because 
section 708 more narrowly restricts the scope of Title VII preemption 
than section 1104 restricts preemption for the entire Act, applying section 
1104 would have the effect of permitting forms of preemption forbidden 
by the very terms of Title VII.92 
statutes 'istheoretically possible"') (quoting Tr. of Oral Argwnent 6); infra text accompanying notes 
115-19 (discussing dual liability as not a preemptive conflict). The Guerra dissent argued that the 
PDA. by its terms, fo.tbids more favorable treatment of pregnant workers than of nonpregnant 
workers. 479 U.S. at 298-99 (White, J., dissenting). 
n Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289. 
n !d. But see infra text accompanying note 139 (diSGUSSing the test for obstacle preemption as 
something more than whether the goals of the federal and state law are the same) . 
., Guerra, 479 U.S. at 292. But see infra note 93 (noting scholarly disagreement with the 
applicability of section 1104 to Title VII preemption). 
"' Guerra, 479 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the possibility of preemption 
because the California law did "not remotely purport to require or pennit any refusal to accord 
federally mandated equal treatment to others similarly situated''). It was, in Justice Scalia's view, 
unnecessacy to reach the question of whether the PDA prohibits preferences based on pregnancy. !d. 
at 296. 
" !d. at 295. 
91 ld. In other words, because the preemption provision specifically applicable to Title VII 
provides for less preemption than was possible under section 1104, Justice Scalia found the latter to 
be irrelevant 
The,three-justice Guerra dissent did not need to reach the question ofwheth~ section 1104 
obstacle preemption was a possibility. It found physical impossibility preemption under section 708. 
!d. at 298 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent construed the PDA to forbid preferences based on 
pregnancy and construed the California law to require that greater benefits be given to pregnant 
workers than to other workers. I d. The dissent argued that, "lb ]ecause the California law pennits 
employers to single out pregnancy for preferential treatment and therefore violate Title VII, it is not 
saved by § 708 which limits pre-emption of state laws to those that require or pennit an employer 
to commit an unfair employment practice." /d. 
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Although disagreement on the question of whether Title VII is 
capable of obstacle preemption may seem to confuse the Title VII/fetal 
tort issue, the importance of the disagreement in this context is more 
apparent than real.93 In theory, analysis of the Title VII/fetal tort 
preemption question under the impossibility doctrine is far less likely to 
yield preemption than is analysis under the obstacle doctrine. Situations 
where it is physically impossible to comply with the two laws are less 
likely to occur than situations where the state law merely stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purpose.94 Nevertheless, in the 
Title VII/fetal tort context, the two approaches will prove to be largely 
indistinguishable.95 Under either approach, the chances of preemption 
appear far less likely than Justice Blackmun surmised in Johnson 
Controls.96 
C. Conflict Preemption 
It is clear that there is some tension between the Title VII Johnson 
Controls decision on the one hand and state tort law liability for fetal 
harm on the other. The state law exerts pressure to violate the federal law 
because, by violating the federal law, an employer could avert state tort 
liability.97 What is less clear is whether that tension is sufficient to result 
in preemption. 
Impossibility preemption analysis differs from obstacle preemption 
analysis with respect to how tension is measured. Impossibility analysis 
looks for mutual exclusivity of operation in the two laws.98 Obstacle 
analysis engages in a more ephemeral assessment of statutory goals.99 In 
13 In his treatise American Constitutional Law, Professor Laurence Tribe agrees with Justice 
Scalia that the "antipreemption" provision of Title VII should not be read to pennit preemption where 
there is no facial conflict between the federal and state laws. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUnONAL LAw 482-83 n.8 (2d ed. 1988). 
" See infra notes 98-149 and accompanying text (discussing strictures of impossibility and 
obstacle preemption). 
"See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing similarity between the two conflict 
preemption tests in the Title VII/fetal tort context). 
N See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., ll1 S. Cl ll96, 1208-09 (1991). 
17 The Johnson Controls decision should be read to require employers to make the workplace 
as safe as possible for all employees and their offspring. See supra note 40. The preemption issue 
should arise only where it is impossible for the employer to make the workplace safe for the 
offspring of fertile women. See supra note 19. 
" See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987). 
" "Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under 
the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two step process of first ascertaining the construction of the 
two statutes and then detennining the constitutional question [of] whether they are in conflict." Perez 
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). 
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the Title VII/fetal tort context, however, there is no significant distinc-
tion.1oo 
1. Impossibility Preemption 
Because section 1104, which permits obstacle preemption, 101 may 
be inapplicable to Title VII, that Title's preemptive scope arguably is 
confined to impossibility preemption.102 Thus, only if Title VII requires 
one action and state tort law requires an incompatible action, so that the 
employer must literally choose between the two required actions, is 
federal preemption of state law assured 103 Such true impossibility is 
rare inasmuch as courts are under a duty to reconcile the two laws if 
possible.104 
Defendants advancing the impossibility preemption argument in the 
Title VII/fetal tort situation are likely to lose. If the analysis turns on the 
intended mandates of the state law, courts will find these mandates to be 
entirely consistent with inclusion of women in the workplace. Only when 
the analysis turns away from the intended requirements of the state law, 
focusing instead on the unintended, incidental, effects of the state law, is 
preemption conceivable. Yet, as explained below, permitting the analysis 
to reach into such incidental effects does not comport with the reconcilia-
tion requirement. 
Impossibility pr~emption analysis begins with the task of discerning 
exactly what the two laws require: what act does the state fetal tort law 
I«~ See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. 
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988). 
101 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
103 See Gue"a, 479 U.S. at 281 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132, 142-43 (1963)); id. at 295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988)). But 
see Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1986) 
(holding, despite apparent impossibility of compliance with both laws at once, that Congress did not 
intend to supplant an important state law). 
The impossibility preemption cases are sometimes lumped together with other cases of"explicit 
conflict." See Wiggins, supra note 67, at 43. The analysis in this Article categorizes the explicit 
conflicts, such as that in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 159 (1978), as express 
preemption, and therefore, does not analyze them 
1 
.. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (construing 
state law to allow consistency with the federal law); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949) 
("it 'must be clear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with those of the state to justifY the 
thwarting of state regulation"') (quoting Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157-59 
(1942)); cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) (discussing duty 
not to seek out conflicts between state and federal regulations where none exists) (citations omitted); 
see also James A. Riddle, Note, Preemption of Reconcilable State Regulation: Federal Benefit 
Schemes v. State Marital Property Law, 34 HAsriNGS L.J. 685, 691-92 & n.51 (1983) (acknowledg-
ing that impossibility preemption should be found only when the federal and state law are 
"iueconcilable"). 
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require the employer to do, and is this compelled deed capable of being 
done at the same time the employer is performing all acts required by 
Title VII?105 The Johnson Controls decision plainly sets forth the 
requirements of the federal law in this context: namely, the inclusion of 
women without regard to their fertility. 106 Identifying the state law 
requirements is more complex. 
It is physically impossible to comply with both Title VII and state 
tort law only if the tort law is construed to require employers to exclude 
from the workplace women whose inclusion is guaranteed by Title 
VII.107 A decision about whether state law requires exclusion of such 
women depends on whether the decision maker is constrained by the 
direct mandates of the state law or is instec,Ld free to consider the practical 
results of the state law's operation.108 The state law's direct mandates are 
different from the state law's intended, but unexpressed, mandates, which, 
in turn, may differ from the state law's unintended, but inevitable, 
coercive effect. 
a. State Law's Direct Mandates 
If only direct mandates are relevant, 109 then a facially "benign" 
purpose can save a state law that, in operation, effectuates a violation of 
federal law. 110 State fetal tort laws do not directly compel employers 
lel See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). Needless to say, "act" is used here to 
encompass both the notion of required action and required fotbearance from action. 
lc& See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1199, 1210 (1991). 
107 Whether pressures imposed by tort-damages awards are considered under impossibility or 
obstacle analysis could also make a difference with regard to the police power presumption. For a 
discussion of the police power presumption, see supra note 61 and accompanying text. The 
presumption against federal preemption of state laws protecting health and safety arguably applies 
in obstacle, but not impossibility cases. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (holding 
that '"[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a[n] 
[impossibility] conflict with a valid federal law"') (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 
(1962)); cf. Lynch, supra note 61, at 364 (arguing that preemption of any sort is unlikely when the 
challenged state law protects vital interests within the state's borders-particularly state laws 
protecting against physical injury within the state's borders). 
•e~ It has been suggested that impossibility conflict preemption should occur only when the two 
laws' conflicting requirements are express. See Lynch, supra note 61, at 366. No state law currently 
in effect expressly requires exclusion of fertile women in order to avoid fetal injury. 
109 See Wiggins, supra note 67, at 43 (equating impossibility conflict with "explicit conflict''). 
110 The discussion in the text focuses on the pwposes of the state law in the sense that state law 
is designed to, or does in fact, effectuate a certain end. This should be distinguished from two other 
broader contexts in which pwposes are considered in preemption doctrine. One is the context of field 
preemption, in which a state law's operation upon the same subject matter that the federal law 
operates upon has the effect of preempting the state law. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying 
text. The other is in the context of obstacle preemption, in which the Supreme Court has stressed that 
neither consistency nor identity of the federal and state goals is sufficient to save a state law that 
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either to avoid all fetal injury or to exclude women in an effort to avoid 
such injury. For the most part, the common law judgments that comprise 
state fetal tort law simply require that employers pay damages based on 
injuries to the fetus once the harm has been done.m Hence, compliance 
with the state law, by paying damages, does not render compliance with 
Title VII impossible.112 If the inquiry focuses only on the acts that the 
state law directly requires, then the state fetal tort law in no way conflicts 
with federal anti-discrimination law, and therefore cannot be preempted 
b. State Law's Indirect Mandates 
i. Damage Awards as Coercion 
Although a state law does not directly mandate violation of the 
federal law, it may nevertheless indirectly mandate a violation.113 The 
damages that fetal tort law imposes may have a coercive effect, whether 
intentionally or inadvertently.114 Damages arguably compel whatever 
"'stands as an obstacle"' to the accomplishment of a federal pUipOse. See Gade v. National Solid 
Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1992) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941)). 
111 The universal rule is that a child born alive may maintain a tort action to recover damages for 
prenatal injuries. See McElveen, supra note 11, at 563; see also Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. 1371, 
1372 (W.D. Va. 1975) (summarizing the current status of the law regarding a child's right to recover 
for prenatal injuries) (quoting Ronald F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 
AL.R.3d 1222, 1228 (1971)). 
m Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Cl 2608, 2628 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (A manufacturer .. may decide to accept damages awards as a cost of 
doing business and not alter its behavior in any way."); Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 
1529 (D.C. Cir.) ("[C}ompliance with both federal and state law cannot be said to be impossible: 
Chevron can continue to use the EPA-approved label and can at the same time pay damages to 
successful tort plaintiffs."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); cf. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 
844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.) (holding that federal law regarding vaccinations does not preempt state tort 
laws), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988). In the conflict preemption context, it does not matter that 
the employer experiences additional burdens as a result of being subject to two laws, rather than just 
the federal law, as long as the two burdens imposed are not mutually exclusive. State law is not 
preempted simply by virtue of the fact that it imposes on the employer obligations above and beyond 
those imposed by the federal law. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733, 737 (1949) (double 
punishment acceptable). Damages may, in effect, coerce action that conflicts with the requirements 
of federal law. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620. This constitutes an unexpressed mandate (discussed 
below), rather than an express mandate. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying texl 
m See Cipollone, 112 S. Cl at 2620 (arguing that common law actions premised on the existence 
of a legal duty impose requirements or prohibitions). 
114 The concept of damages as regulation has often arisen in the field preemption context If 
Congress has preempted an area, then the inquicy is whether the states are attempting to regulate a 
subject within that area. In the impossibility preemption context, the damages as regulation inquicy 
focuses not on whether the state is regulating within a federally preempted field, but rather whether 
the state is requiring the defendant to act in a manner inconsistent with behavior required by federal 
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behavior would enable the employer to avoid further imposition of such 
damages.115 
Several Supreme Court cases that declined to preempt state laws' 
imposition of damages for activities also covered by federal law involve 
situations fundamentally different from the Title VII/fetal tort scenar-
io.116 The Supreme Court decisions in question upheld state laws that 
focus on the same subject matter as the federal law where it is possible 
to comply with both laws at once.117 The state laws in such cases 
simply impose heightened standards for behavior already regulated by 
federal law.118 This relationship between the federal and state law does 
law. Though the question is asked for different reasons, the question remains largely one and the 
same: is the state law, by providing for tort damages, requiring or coercing the defendant to act in 
a particular way? One difference, however, is the function of state pmpose in the analysis. For the 
field preemption inquhy, courts focus on whether the states intend to operate in the forbidden arena, 
ignoring incidental side effects that compliance with the state law may have on federal interests. In 
the impossibility context, courts focus exclusively on the practical requirements the state law imposes 
on the defendant. Hence, the state'spmpose is irrelevant here just as it will be in the obstacle conflict 
situation. Accordingly, in his Silkwood dissent, Justice Powell stated "[t)here is no element of 
regulation when compensatocy damages are awarded, especially when liability is imposed without 
fault as authorized by state law." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 276 n.3 (1984) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). Although Justice Powell's observation applies to field preemption analysis, 
it is not applicable to impossibility conflict preemption analysis. 
"' See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (finding an 
obligation to pay compensation to be a potent fotm of regulation); cf. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 276 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that punitive damages are regulatot.y). But see Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2628-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that state common law 
damages do not amount to direct regulation); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 930 
n.30 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting view that common 
law damages effectively regulate). 
m See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90-(1990) (holding that an employee 
could recover in tort for employer•s retaliatot.y response to employee's reporting of employer•s 
violation of federal nuclear safety standards); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249-58 (allowing tort recovet.y 
for plutonium contamination of employee even though federal law occupied the nuclear energy field 
including all safety aspects ofplant operation). Similarly, in Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. 
Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), the court held that tort damages were not preempted by federal law 
because the defendant could simply make an economic choice to compensate future victims and 
continue in its tortious activity. !d. at 1113. 
117 See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208-09 (1991) 
(distinguishing between state laws that expand upon the requirements of the federal laws and state 
laws that make compliance with federal law impossible). 
111 See English, 496 U.S. at 88-90 (distinguishing between state tort law allowing for recovecy 
for nuclear injucy and federal law pertaining to nuclear safety); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249-58 (same); 
see also Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("mere compliance 
with [federal or state] regulatot.y labeling requirements does not preclude a [jucy from] finding that 
additional warnings should have been given'); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 
(5th Cir. 1985) (compliance with federal automobile safety standards does not exempt manufacturer 
from tort liability); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 939 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that compliance 
with federal safety standards is not a defense to state tort claims against automobile manufacturers). 
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not make it impossible for an individual to comply with both laws at 
once.119 
In the Title VII/fetal tort context, by contrast, the two laws pull in 
opposite directions. Rather than simply imposing a heightened standard to 
encourage exactly the behavior the federal law mandates, state tort law tends 
to encourage employers to engage in precisely the behavior that the federnl 
law forbids. In this setting, damages can create an impossibility conflict if 
they exert sufficient pressure on the employer to cause the exclusion of 
women from the workplace. The question is: how much pressure is required? 
The probable answer is that there must be sufficient pressure on the employer 
to effectuate the feared exclusion. As explained below, the hypothetical threat 
of a Title VII violation will not be enough. 
ii. Intended Coercion 
If the analysis focuses on acts that state law does not expressly require, 
but that it nevertheless intentionally coerces, the potential for impossibility 
preemption is greater than where the analysis merely focuses on the express 
mandates of the state law.'20 Even considering these unexpressed, but 
intended, mandates of fetal tort law, however, a preemption result is unlikely. 
Whether the state tort law rests on theories of negligence or strict liability, 
neither presents truly fertile grounds for preemption. 
If negligence law is viewed as coercive, its goal is to cause the 
employer to take reasonable precautions to avert fetal injury. Negligence 
law thus may effectively coerce the employer to exclude women from the 
workplace, if exclusion is the only way that the employer can avoid fetal 
injury.121 The "reasonable precautions" that negligence law requires, 
however, should not be deemed to include expulsion of women from the 
workplace. Such expulsion is not a legally available option, and thus is not 
Judge Hornsby also asserted that the imposition of state common law tort damages does not amount 
to regulation. I d. at 943. Hornsby explained that a defendant can pay the jury verdict and comply 
with the minimal federal standard, rather than adhere to the heightened safety standard that the jury 
imposes. Id. 
Although the Supreme Court may permit damages where state law imposes a standard higher 
than the federal standard on the same subject matter, federal law forbids such state standards if the 
federal law has occupied a field encompassing the matter that results in state tort liability. See supra 
notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
1
" See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256. 
1m Professor Wiggins has suggested that the impossibility category of preemption should actually 
focus on whether the laws are facially in conflict, rather than (or in addition to) on whether it is 
impossible to comply with both. See Wiggins, supra note 67, at 43. 
121 This Article focuses only on the plight of the employer who is unable to avert injury by the 
use of mechanisms short of excluding women. See supra note 19. 
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"reasonable."122 An employer that takes all legally available precautions 
should, in principle, not be found liable under a negligence theory.123 
If negligence law does not intend to coerce exclusion of women, it 
is even more clear that strict liability law is not intended to effectuate this 
result. On the contrary, a major purpose of strict liability law is the 
allocation of loss, rather than modification of tortfeasor behavior}24 
State strict liability law thus does not intentionally require action in 
contravention of Title VII.125 Like the state law's direct mandates, the 
state law's unexpressed, but intended, requirements do not coerce acts in 
violation of Title VII. Whether predicated upon negligence or strict 
liability, the state tort law is ''benign" in intent. Consequently, impossibil-
ity preemption is unlikely. 
iii. Unintended Coercion 
The third way of looking at state law requirements is to focus on the 
inadvertent impact of the state law. State law may be read to require not 
just the act that it mandates directly (payment of damages) and the act 
that it intentionally, but implicitly, requires (e.g., t;aking reasonable 
precautions to avoid fetal injury), but also any act that will inevitably, 
although inadvertently, follow from the direct and implied mandates. 
Because fetal tort law penalizes the employer for injuries that could be 
121 If the state negligence law can be read to intend that the employer exclude women, even 
though such exclusion violates the federal law, then the employer could avoid liability through the 
preemption doctrine. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Likewise, a state law that requires 
the defendant to violate federal law is in direct conflict with the federal law, and thus preempted. See 
supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
•n International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. CL 1196, 1208 (1991) (arguing 
that, absent negligence, an employer that warns employees and complies with OSHA regulations 
should not be liable). However, where such an employer is held liable, the coercive effect of the state 
law is to facilitate violation of Title Vll. If, on the other hand, precautions other than exclusion of 
women are available and the employer fails to take them, then liability results from the employer's 
own dereliction of duty, rather than from the employer's compliance with Title VII. 
m Likewise, finding no preemption is consistent with the whole notion of strict liability. The 
strict liability rationale is that the employer finds it profitable enough to engage in this particularly 
dangerous business and is, therefore, the proper party to bear the cost of damage done by the 
business. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1979) (strict liability founded upon policy 
imposing on one who, for his own purposes, creates abnonnal risks of hann to his neighbors). The 
negligence rationale is that, if the workplace cannot be made safe and fertile women must be 
admitted, then it is unfair to subject the employer to lawsuits based on injuries the employer could 
not avoid. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 282 cmL f(1979) (negligence does not include acts 
"which, although done with every precaution ..• practicable .•• involve an irreducible minimum of 
danger to others"). 
ns See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 276 n.3 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that there is no element of regulation when state tort law imposes compensatory damages 
without allocating fault). 
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avoided if the employer were to exclude women, arguably tort law 
unintentionally requires the exclusion of such women.126 A state tort law 
that applies such "irresistible" pressure to exclude women arguably is 
preempted in the same manner as a state statute that by its tenns or intent 
requires exclusion of women.127 The inquiiy therefore becomes whether 
the state tort liability for fetal hann is likely to create such irresistible 
pressure to violate Title VII. 
Given the context in which the irresistible pressure argument is likely 
to arise, a fmding of preemption seems improbable. The most likely 
occasion for the preemption argument is in a tort suit predicated on fetal 
harm, in which the employer attempts to defend with the argument that 
Title VII forbade the only expedient that could have averted the injury: 
namely, exclusion of the mother.128 When this matter is before the 
court, the defendant will not actually have been pushed over the 
theoretical edge into violating Title VII, for its exposure to tort liability 
will result precisely from compliance with Title VII. Instead, the 
defending employer will argue that, if the court does not excuse the 
employer from the strictures of the state tort law in this case, the financial 
pressures of potential tort liability will be so severe as to compel the 
employer (and perhaps other employers) to violate Title VII to avoid the 
prospect of repeated liability. Only when extant employer liability history 
demonstrates that the state tort law has actually caused Title VII 
violations are courts likely to fmd that Title VII preempts the state tort 
law in pending cases. 
The question of whether fear of tort liability will cause violations of 
Title VII will thus arise, at least initially, as a hypothetical threat, rather 
than as a fact before the court. The conjectural character of the inquiry 
does not bode well for employers invoking the defense. Courts commonly 
126 The employer faced with the prospect of such liability may .find it more cost-effective to 
exclude women from the workforce and pay them damages under Title VII, rather than admit the 
women and pay tort damages based on fetal injwy. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
127 This situation differs from that where an entire federal scheme is thwarted by the state law. 
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. In the case of DPT vaccine injuries, for example, it 
was argued that "[t]ort judgments threatened the availability of sufficient DPT vaccine to cany out 
[the goal of federal] inununization programs." Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine 
Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REv. 655, 693 (1989). 
'a Most of the cases dealing with the question of whether federal law preempts state tort law 
arise in the context of tort suits. See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) 
(tort suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
238, 243 (1984) (tort suit for plutonium contamination). Of course, employers have the option to 
bring declaratocy judgment actions in an effort to establish preemption. See, e.g., Gade v. National 
Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (1992). When the state law alleged to be 
preempted is statutocy, those challenging it may sue for declaratocy judgment, naming as defendants 
those charged with enforcement of the state law. See, e.g., id. 
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seek concrete evidence that the pressure exerted by state law damages is 
actually causing violations of the federal law.129 
The Supreme Court's Guen'a decision supports the proposition that 
financial burdens imposed by state law do not portend preemptive conflict 
absent actual violations of the federal law.130 The Guen'a Court was 
willing to reject preemption even if the state law imposed pressure to 
violate the federal law and even if the only measure available to avert the 
need of such violation was extremely costly to the employer.131 In 
Guerra, if the PDA required equality between benefits to pregnant 
workers and others, the Court was willing to impose on the employer the 
perhaps prohibitively costly requirement that it provide nonpregnant 
workers the same benefits required by state law for pregnant workers.132 
As long as the employer could, in theory, bring its practices into 
compliance with both laws, then preemption would not occur.133 
Similarly, the employer in the Title VII/fetal tort .situation can achieve 
the ends required by state law by a mechanism (payment of tort damages) 
short of excluding women. in contravention of Title VII.134 In fact, the 
121 See Boyle v. United Tcx:hnologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1988); Rice v. Norman 
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 313 (1960). But see 
Schneidewind v. ANRPipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293,310 (1988); Macyland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 
751 (1981); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1963). As long 
as the facts before the court present a situation in which it is the state rather than the federal law that 
is violated, preemption is unlikely. Cf. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 720-21 (1985) (holding that state law did not threaten accomplishment of federal goal); 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 549 {1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that in 
absence of explicit preemptive clause no preemption should be found); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-93 (1974) (holding state trade secret law not preempted by federal patent 
law); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973) (holding that the power to grant copyrights 
is not under exclusive federal control). But see Rath Pac/dng Co., 430 U.S. at 541 (holding state Jaw 
that required different labeling information preempted because it was an obstacle to accomplishment 
of federal purposes). The question is not just whether the employer will be tempted, but whether the 
temptation will be irresistible. 
ll<l See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 {1987). 
1)1 [d. 
m See id. (relying on petitioners' concession at oral argument "that compliance with both statutes 
'is theoretically possible"') (quoting Tr. of Oral Argument 6). 
m !d. at 290-92. Guemz suggests that the Supreme Court evaluates the question of whether dual 
compliance is physically impossible, in theoretical tenns, without considering the practical feasibility. 
/d. The Gue"a Court simply assumed that the State of California would be financially able to give 
unpaid leave to nonpregnant workers. /d. at 291. 
I:IC Heartless as it may sound, the payment of strict liability tort damages may be viewed, like 
licensing requirements, as just another cost of doing business in compliance with applicable laws. 
Admittedly, there is an important difference between the Guemz situation and the Title VII/fetal tort 
situation. In the fonner, the employer is incurring costs in the fonn of payment of additional 
employee benefits. In the latter, the employer is incurring costs in the fonn of damages resulting from 
hann to fetuses, an expenditure undoubtedly repugnant for more than financial reasons. It should be 
noted, however, that if the employer has made the workplace as safe as possible, it is the mother who 
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employer's violation of the state law in the envisioned tort suit is 
evidence that any irresistible urge will be in the direction of violating 
state law, not federal law. Thus, the posture of the case before the 
court actually goes a long way toward convincing the court that 
irresistible pressure is not present. 
2. Obstacle Preemption 
State laws that impose "obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and 
execution ofthe full purposes and objectives of Congress" are deemed 
contrary to federal law for purposes of preemption analysis.135 
Although the Supremacy Clause calls for the preemption of any state 
law that is contrary to a valid federal law, the Supremacy Clause does 
not require that every state law that interferes with the accomplish-
ment of a federal purpose be preempted.136 In fact, the difficult part 
of obstacle preemption analysis, as with impossibility analysis, is 
determining how much interference is sufficient interference to render 
the state law preempted. 
Cases analyzing laws alleged to be obstacles to federal purposes 
generally disclose a two-fold inquiry. 137 The first part of the inquiry 
considers whether the federal purpose alleged to be obstructed by the 
operation of state law is, indeed, a purpose of the federal law.138 
retains the power to decide whether to risk fetal hann. 
us Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass' n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); 
Schneidewind v. ANRPipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Cotp., 464 
U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Cotp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974); Perez v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971). 
The difference between impossibility analysis and obstacle analysis is that obstacle analysis 
pennits preemption of state law even where no actual violation of federal law is likely to occur, or 
where the violator of the federal law will be someone other than the one upon whom the state 
imposes its requirement. If the state law entails interference with some ultimate puipOse of the federal 
law, but does not translate into an affirmative obligation to violate federal law, then obstacle 
preemption is the appropriate approach. One writer has described obstacle preemption as a type of 
preemption used by courts "when they can locate no other justification for preemption." Hoke, supra 
note 63, at 750. 
llf See CTS Cozp. v. Dynamics Cotp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987) (holding state law allowing 
delay in tender offers not preempted by state law). 
137 For discussions of the federalism issues relevant to the inquiry, see Fernandez, supra note 65, 
at 1241-42; Hoke, supra note 63, at 701-10; and Wiggins, supra note 67, at 24-30. 
131 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 136-37 (1973). 
Discerning the puipOse of the federal law can, of course, present difficulties in some cases. See 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991) (rejecting proffered puipOses 
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Second, the inquiry turns to the frequently more irksome question of 
whether the state law's operation obstructs the accomplishment of this 
federal purpose enough to render the state law an "obstacle."139 In other 
words, does the state law require behavior that precludes the achievement 
of the federal goal or prohibit behavior necessary to its achievement?140 
In judicial decisions, obstacle analysis routinely follows upon a court's 
conclusion that the relationship between the federal and state law does not 
call for impossibility preemption.141 In such cases, the court may fmd 
that, even though it is possible to comply with both laws, there is 
something about compliance with the state law that will interfere with the 
accomplishment of federal objectives distinct from the affirmative 
obligations imposed by the federal law. Such sequential analysis is almost 
certainly unnecessary in the Title VII/fetal tort context, however, because 
in this context the court's rejection of impossibility preemption assures 
rejection of obstacle preemption as well. 
of the federal statute as "rest[ing] .on little more than snippets of legislative history and policy 
speculations''); CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 97.99 {White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's 
identification of the federal statute's goals for pwposes of obstacle analysis). 
111 According to Professor Fernandez, if the state law does not make it impossible to achieve 
the federal pwposes, then the court should gauge the extent to which the incidental effects of the 
state law nevertheless "make ••• more difficult or ..• delay the achievement of the federal goal 
•••• " Fernandez, supra note 65, at 1248. For this category of cases, Professor Fernandez advocates 
balancing the benefits to be achieved by the stated goals of the state statute against the degree of 
hann to the federal regulatory scheme .. !d. One difficulty with this approach is that it may force 
courts to make value·laden, legislative·like choices between substantive governmental interests. Id. 
at 124849; cf. Riddle, supra note 104, at 689 (discussing subjective, judicial interpretation of federal 
legislation in the context of preemption inquires). Courts might be able to achieve the goals 
envisioned by Professor Fernandez by balancing the detriment to the federal scheme against the 
detriment to the state interest, as is done in the conflict of laws situation. See Bernhard v. Harrah's 
Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976). This would be a more objective test that would not require 
the court to measure the worth of the substantive values underlying the state law, but would instead 
permit the court simply to assess the comparative impairment of presumptively valid state goals that 
would result from a decision not to apply state law. See Naile, supra note 127, at 695 ("If the state 
interest is strong and only the potential for conflict exists, the state regulation may stand.'') (citing 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973)); Lynch, supra note 61, 
at 386. Responding to the problem of excessive judicial discretion resulting from his proposal, 
Professor Fernandez argues that courts exercise such discretion every time they determine the 
occupation of a field by federal legislation or define the goals of federal legislation. Fernandez, 
supra note 65, at 1249. 
140 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the Supreme Court indicated that a state statute 
interfering with the federal objective of avoiding delay in tender offers did not constitute a 
preemptive obstacle where the statute did not make delay inevitable. 481 U.S. 69, 84 (1987). 
141 See, e.g., id. at 79 ("Because it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both [federal 
and state law], the state statute can be pre-empted only if it frustrates the purposes of the federal 
law.''); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (applying obstacle 
analysis after impossibility analysis). 
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In the typical case that entails both impossibility and obstacle 
analysis, the court's impossibility analysis focuses on the interference 
with the affirmative obligations imposed by the federal law, whereas 
the obstacle analysis focuses on a federal goal above and beyond 
simply obtaining compliance with those obligations. In the Title 
VII/fetal tort context, by contrast, proponents of preemption would 
not be able to cite any federal objective different from the goal of 
inclusion of women-precisely the goal already analyzed in the 
impossibility query. In rejecting impossibility preemption, the court 
will have rejected the contention that state law thwarts this objective. 
The purpose of Title VII, as construed in Johnson Controls, 142 
is to assure the inclusion of women in the workplace without regard 
to their reproductive status.143 If the pressure that fetal tort liability 
imposes on employers to interfere with this federal purpose is 
insufficient to effectuate impossibility preemption, then it is equally 
insufficient to effectuate obstacle preemption. If it is possible for an 
employer to bear the costs of fetal tort liability without succumbing 
to the temptation to violate Title VII, then any threat to the purpose 
of Title VII is far too attenuated to constitute an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of that purpose.144 The duty to reconcile the state 
law with the federal law, moreover, should be especially strong in this 
context. 145 State law imposing damages liability for fetal harm is an 
exercise of the police power in an area of peculiarly local con-
cem.146 The duty is further strengthened by the fact that Congress 
has not, in the allegedly preemptive federal legislation, made any 
provision for the need addressed by the state law.147 Those injured 
by these hazards certainly cannot tum to Title VII to seek recovery. 
142 International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991). 
10 Id. 
144 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
1u But cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2632 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the proposition that federal law should be narrowly 
construed). 
1
" See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991); supra note 61. 
147 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Co., 464 U.S. 238, 252 (1984). Although it was argued above that 
congressional intent is irrelevant to conflict analysis, see supra note 63, courts may have a special 
duty to ~oncile where the absence of congresSional intent to preempt is clear, as it is here. If 
Congress bad thought about tort liability when it enacted Title VII, it would not have intended to 
pennit employers to escape liability, anymore than it intended to pennit them to escape liability 
under state fair employment laws. Cf. H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) 
(finding a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state safety regulation). 
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Title VII thus is unlikely to preempt state fetal tort law .148 
Employers concerned about tort liability resulting from workplace 
fetal hazards must look elsewhere for an escape from the quandary. 
If Title VII will not preempt employer liability for fetal harm, then, 
absent legislation, employers will escape their quandary only if the 
prospect of unavoidable tort liability can support a BFOQ defense for 
employers excluding fertile women from the workplace in ostensible 
violation of Title VII.149 · 
III. THE BFOQ DEFENSE: CosT AS BUSINESS EssENCE150 
If an employer cannot rely on the federal preemption doctrine to 
avert fetal tort liability, then it may elect instead to exclude women 
in apparent violation of Johnson Controls in the hope that some 
remnant of the BFOQ defense remains intact for fetal protection 
cases. Although the Johnson Controls Court rejected the altruistically 
based BFOQ proffered in that case, it did not actually decide the issue 
of whether the defense might by predicated upon the cost of tort 
liability. In fact, the Court's holding suggests that the BFOQ may 
operate where the cost of tort liability would be high. 
A. Business Essence 
To establish the BFOQ defense, the employer must show that 
being a member of the favored sex (here males and infertile women) 
is a qualification necessary to performance of an essential aspect of 
••• It may be argued that employers doing all within their power to protect fetal health should 
not bear financial responsibility for injuries they could not have averted. Parents who choose to risk 
the health of their fetuses arguably should be responsible, whether in tort or otherwise, for the 
results of their risk-taking. It would be difficult as a practical matter to move the burden from the 
employer to the parents. If a pregnant or soon-to-be pregnant woman decides to stay in a hazardous 
work environment, the employer may obtain a legally binding waiver of the woman's own right to 
bring subsequent legal action against the employer for hann to her own health. The woman is 
powerless, however, to waive the right of the fetus to sue in the future. See International Union, 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Cl 1196, 1211 (1991) (White, J., concurring). Employers 
concerned about fetal tort liability may use the expedient of a contract providing that parents who 
elect to undergo exposure despite warnings will indemnify the employer for fetal damage. Yet, many 
workers do not possess the financial resources, including inSurance, that would pennit them to 
indemnify employers for such tort liability. See Lawrence Postol et al., The Binh of Uncontrolled 
Injury, RECORDER, May 23, 1991, at 4. 
1
" See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
uo The term "costs" is used to include both affirmative expenditures and profit losses. 
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the job. In order to make this showing, the employer must demon-
strate: 
(1) that the aspect of the job which women1s1 are unable to 
perform is part of the "essence" of the defendant's business, rather 
than something "peripheral to the central mission of the ... busi-
ness, " 152 and 
(2) that all or substantially all members of the excluded class are 
incapable of performing the job, so that exclusion of the class is 
necessary. 153 This "necessity'' requirement actually may have two 
facets: 
(a) exclusion of females, rather than some measure short of 
exclusion, must be necessary;154 and 
(b) the defendant must have a factual basis for believing 
either 
(1) that virtually all women are incapable of performing 
the job without sacrificing the goal, tss or 
"
1 In the context of fetal protection, the women whose exclusion the employer seeks to justify 
are the subcategocy of fertile women. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) 
(holding that discriminating against a subset of women and not a comparable subset of men 
constitutes sex discrimination). The fact that only a subset of women is affected has no impact on 
the analysis. See supra not.es 6, 42-43. 
m Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985) (citing Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)); see Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), cited with approval in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321, 333 (1977); see also Torres v. Wisconsin Dep'tofHealth & Social Setvs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 
(7th Cir. 1988) (first step in deciding applicability of BFOQ defense is understanding employer's 
business), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989). The "essence" 
requirement derives from the requirement in the statutocy language setting forth the BFOQ that the 
qualification be necessacy to the particular business of the employer. See Brown, supra note 11, at 
512. One writer has argued that courts have applied the "essence" test articu1ated in Diaz in two 
different manners: (I) as a requirement that exclusion of one sex be necessaxy to the vecy essence of 
the total business and (2) as a requirement that exclusion of one sex be necessacy to the essence of the 
particu1ar job. Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1025, 1043· n.ll3 (1977). Another conunentator has noted that after 
Dothard the courts have applied a hybrid test combining the two above tests. Befort, supra note 24, 
at 13. The present Article assumes that the essence requirement focuses on the need to employ 
members of a particu1ar sex in order to assure accomplishment of some aspect of the particu1ar job, 
which is essential to the vecy functioning of the business. 
'" See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388. 
154 See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1984); Robinson v. Lorillard 
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), and cert. dismissed, 404 
U.S. 1007 (1972); if. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978) 
(allowing sex discrimination based on the privacy rights of customers only if there is no way the 
employer can selectively assign jobs to avoid conflicts). Professor Befort has suggested that this "no 
reasonable, less discri~ry alternative" criterion applies only in cases where client safety and 
privacy are at stake. Befort, supra note 24, at 16-17. 
us Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), cited in Dothard, 
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(2) that some women are incapable of performing the 
job without sacrificing the goal and there is no way to 
distinguish between those women who could do the job and 
those who could not.156 
The crux of the Johnson Controls debate on whether the BFOQ 
defense should be available in fetal protection cases is the question of 
what kinds of goals can qualify as business "essence" under the first 
prong of the BFOQ analysis.157 
B. An Unresolved Issue 
Part of the Johnson Controls holding is that fetal safety can never 
be the essence ·of a manufacturing business. The employer's goal of 
433 U.S. at 333. The BFOQ defense is most clearly implicated in situations where physical 
differences between the sexes disqualify one sex and not the other from perfonning the task at hand. 
Accordingly, the BFOQ would clearly be available to enable an employer in the business of 
providing wet-nursing services to hire only women. See Rosenfeld v. Southern. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 
1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971). Under the analysis set forth in the text, wet nursing is the essence of the 
business; that is, possession of breasts is necessary to wet nurse, so exclusion of males is necessaty 
to achieve the goal, and virtually all men lack the qualification in question. The Civil Rights 
Commission, established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, bas also acknowledged that the BFOQ 
defense is applicable where employment of members of a particular sex is necessary for authenticity, 
e.g., a male or female acting role. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(aX2) (1992). Although courts have approved 
application of the BFOQ defense beyond such biological difference and authenticity situations, the 
BFOQ remains a very narrow defense. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (noting the "virtually uniform 
view of the federal courts that [BFOQ defense] provides only the narrowest of exceptions''). But see 
Sirota, supra note 152, at 1026 (arguing that "[t]he meager legislative history of the BFOQ provision 
indicates that Congress intended it to have broad application in the area of sex discrimination''). 
151 This standard bas emerged in cases where inclusion of the class at issue allegedly threatens 
the safety of third persons. See Usery, 531 F.2d at 235-36; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 n.5; cf. Western 
Airlines, 472 U.S. at 414-18 (adopting Weeks standard for age discrimination cases based on safety 
considerations). 
157 Recall that the employer's first task in proving this defense is to show that the task for which 
women are not qualified is the "essence" of the business. There are three possible purposes that 
employers could offer to justify their fetal protection policies as BFOQs. They might proffer fetal 
protection as a goal unto itsel~ the way Johnson Controls did. See International Union, UA W v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. CL 1196, 1208 (1991). They might proffer the goal of saving costs 
either by averting potential tort liability, or by avoiding the expense of accommodating the workplace 
to women. Such acconunodation might include measures to shield women from excessive lead 
exposure. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 
{11th Cir. 1984), was willing to recognize fetal health as a proper foundation for the business 
necessity defense, but was unwilling to recognize the cost of such prospective tort liability as such 
a foundation. !d. at 1553 n.15. Employers might also proffer good public relations goals as a reason 
for not wanting to endanger fetuses. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 905 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
In addition to failing the essence requirement, Johnson Controls' policy also failed the BFOQ 
requirement that all or substantially all women be disqualified. International Union, UA W v. Johnson 
Controls, 111 S. CL 1196, 1208 (1991). Johnson Controls' plan excluded all women within a given 
age group who did not supply medical documentation of their infertility, regardless of the women's 
procreative plans. !d. at 1200. 
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protecting future generations, then, cannot support a BFOQ to defend 
a sex-specific fetal protection plan.158 Five justices joined in this 
portion of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion.159 
In concluding that fetal safety is not the essence of the business, 
however, Justice Blackmon's opinion ventured beyond the narrow fetal 
safety defense that Johnson Controls had offered. Justice Blackmun 
additionally answered the broader question of what, besides the 
rejected fetal safety factor, will qualifY as business essence for 
purposes of the BFOQ. In particular, Justice Blackmun rejected the 
idea that defendants could rely on the costs of tort liability as a 
foundation for the BFOQ in fetal protection cases.160 He argued that 
the Supreme Court a,nd Congress had already rejected costs-savings 
as a ground for pregnancy-related exclusion of women.161 Justice 
Blackmun read in the statutory language of Title VII congressional 
intent to limit availability of the defense to situations where the 
151 The five-justice majority, joined by Justice Scalia for purposes of this issue, ruled that the 
simple, altruistic goal of fetal protection (the rationale actually offered by the defendant in the case), 
was not the essence of the business. ~ Ill S. Ct. at 1207; id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). In 
fact, Johnson Controls' expressed pwpose for the policy was "protecting pregnant women and their 
unborn children from dangerous blood lead levels.'' 886 F.2d at 876. According to Justice Blackmun's 
opinion for the majority, "[ d]ecisions about the welfare of future children nrust be left to the parents 
who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire those parents.'' 
Ill S. Ct. at 1207. This rationale of the holding should extend to prohibit policies that exclude 
pregnant women, as well as to those that exclude all fertile women. But see Johnson Controls, 886 
F.2d at 898 (holding that Johnson Controls' policy constituted a BFOQ); id. at 904 (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that employer's business essence encompasses the ethical and legal concerns 
of the employer). 
m Justice White argued in a concurrence joined by two other justices, that a fetal-safety based 
BFOQ defense could conceivably be available to Johnson Controls, but that the record before the 
Court was too sparse to tell. 111 S. Ct. at 1212-15 (White, J., concurring). 
'"' Id. at 1208-09. 
1
'
1 Id. at 1209 (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 
& n.32 (1978) and Arizona Governing Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983)); see Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1988). In fact, Justice Blackmun took the position that 
the BFOQ should never be available to defend fetal protection policies, regardless of what puxpose 
the employer articulates. ll1 S. Ct. at 1207-09. For Justice Blackmun, the first prong of the BFOQ 
defense uses the tenn "essence" to mean only the production of and profit from the product, and not 
additional prefatozy goals such as preserving fetal health or otherwise making the world a better 
place. !d. at 1205-06. In the wake of Johnson Controls, "only when an employer has pointed to a 
specific, legitimate safety responsibility necessarily assumed by the employer that is not generally 
shared by evezy other person in the workforce has the narrow 'safety BFOQ'been met.'' Brown, supra 
note 11, at 515. In so ruling, the Court confined the safety justification that had been recognized as 
supporting the BFOQ to situations where the individuals whose safety was threatened were 
"customers [or] third parties whose safety is essential to the business of battezy manufacturing." 
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206. On the question of cost-based BFOQs, by contrast, Justice 
Blaclanun did note at the end of his opinion that costs so steep that they threaten to ruin the 
employer might qualify as business essence. Id. at 1208-09; see infra note 163, 174-95 and 
accompanying text. 
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excluded women were literally unable to perform the rudimentary 
functions of the job, regardless of cost considerations.162 At the same 
time that he pronounced the irrelevance of cost factors, however, 
Justice Blackinun also acknowledged that cost justifications, particu-
larly those involving ruinous costs, were not before the Court, so 
required no ruling in any event.163 
Justices White and Scalia, by contrast, predicted in separate 
concurrences that there would be cases in which the BFOQ would 
justify fetal protection policies.164 These justices believed that cost 
justifications, whether based on potential fetal tort liability or on the 
expense of transforming the workplace to accommodate women, could 
constitute business essence for BFOQ purposes!65 The Johnson 
m "[M]ost telling," in Justice Blackmun's view, was the statutocy term "occupational," which 
"indicates that ••• [the employer's] requirements must concern job-related skills and aptitudes." 111 
S. Ct. at 1204. Justice Blackmun argued that, "[b]y modifying 'qualification' with 'occupational,' 
Congress natrowed the term to qualifications that affect an employee' s ability to do the job." I d. at 
1205. Although Justice White suggested that no court had ever similarly relied upon the 
"occupational" language, id. at 1210 n.1 (White, J., concurring), it would seem that the first two 
prongs of the BFOQ analysis derive, in part, from this language. 
10 Id. at 1208-09; see id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the issue not resolved). 
Although the majority opinion contains language rejecting cost considerations as an adequate 
rationale for the BFOQ defense, Justice Blackmun arguably limited the Court's holding to situations 
where the rationale offered in defense of the policy was the goal of protecting fetuses, as opposed 
to the goal of protecting finances. In addition, he noted that "costs •.. so prohibitive as to threaten 
the survival of the employer's business" were not before the Court. Id. at 1209; see infra notes 174-
95 and accompanying text (discussing ruinous costs). 
Although the issue of cost justification was not before the Court, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Conunission (''EEOC'') and commentators have suggested that the case decided that cost 
justifications cannot support a BFOQ defense. See, e.g., EEOC: Policy Guidance on the Supreme 
Court's Johnson Controls Decision, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6941, 6943 (June 28, 1991); Postol 
& Adelman, supra note 10, at 37. But see Marcia Coyle, Fetal-ProtecJion Ruling Buoys Rights 
Groups, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1991, at 5 (suggesting that Johnson Controls left open the natrow 
possibility of a cost-based BFOQ for fetal protection plans). 
1
" 111 S. Ct. at 1210 {White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). With regard to 
the scope of the BFOQ defense, Justice White wrote that showing that a policy is "'reasonably 
necessary' to the 'normal operation' of making batteries, which is Johnson Controls' 'particular 
business,"' would be difficult, but not impossible. Id. at 1210 {White, J., concurring). Along with the 
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, Justice White joined with the majority in reversing the affirmance 
of sununaxy judgment, but only because he believed that the Johnson Controls' policy was ovetbroad 
and because there remained factual issues about whether the Johnson Controls' policy comported with 
the elements of the BFOQ defense. Id. at 1210, 1214-15 (White, J., concurring). Facts remaining in 
dispute were: whether the employer demanded a risk-avoidance level for fetuses substantially higher 
than risk levels tolerated for others, such as employees and consumers; whether the risks of fetal 
harm or associated costs had substantially increased to justify the employer's decision to adopt a 
broader policy than it had earlier used; and whether harm caused to offspring by lead exposure in 
females was sufficiently in excess of that caused by exposure of males to warrant exclusion of only 
women. Id. at 1215 (White, J., concurring). 
1
'
1 As indicated above, the two disagreed on whether the goal of protecting future generations, 
standing alone, could support the BFOQ defense. On this issue, Justice Scalia a~eed with the 
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Controls Corporation, Justice Scalia remarked, simply had not 
presented such rationales.166 
The Supreme Court's stance in Johnson Controls leaves some 
doubt about whether the cost-based BFOQ defense can ever save a 
fetal protection plan. Lower courts may feel bound by Justice 
Blackmun's pr.onouncements on the cost BFOQ issue}67 His state-
ments can arguably be characterized as part of a very broad holding 
in the case: that sex-specific fetal protection plans are absolutely 
unlawful without exception.168 It appears, moreover, that Justice 
White, who disagreed with Justice Blackmun on the question, viewed 
the holding of Johnson Controls broadly enough to encompass Justice 
Blackmun's rejection of the cost justification defense.169 
Although the cost justification language has been and will be cited 
as part of the Court's holding, there is good reason to consider it 
dicta. Justice Blackmun qualified his statements with the caveat that 
"Johnson Controls has not argued that it faced any costs from tort 
liability."170 In addition to Justice Blackmun's own statements of 
majority that the employer's interest in fetal health, standing alone, could not support the BFOQ. I d. 
at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, for Justice Scalia, as for Justice Blacknnm, the question of fetal 
safety was a question for parents, not employers, to answer. Justice White believed that fetal 
protection interests, alone, could support a BFOQ defense, but that Johnson Controls had not shown 
evidence of substantial fetal health risks. Id. at 1214-15 (White, J., concurring). 
1
" I d. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, 
886 F.2d 871, 914 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting Johnson Controls' failure to 
argue that the costs from tort liability or transfonning the workplace for safety reasons were 
prohibitive), rev'd, 111 S. Ct 1196 (1991). Justice Scalia apparently had additional, unexpressed 
resexvations about the majority's opinion. See 111 S. Cl at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
161 See Befort, supra note 24, at 53 ("[T]he potential for a future return to . . • expansionaxy 
viewpoints [on BFOQ] should not be dismissed entirely ..•. [T]he majority's narrow construction 
won the support of only five justices [, and] [t]he appointment of a more consexvative jurist than 
Justice Souter ••• may well have led to a vexy different formulation of the BFOQ test."); Coyle, 
supra note 163, at 5 (suggesting that Johnson Controls left open the narrow possibility of cost BFOQ 
for fetal protection plans). Subsequent lower court decisions that have cited Johnson Controls in 
connection with the BFOQ have pertained to privacy and religion, rather than cost justifications. See 
Hernandez v. University of St Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214, 216-17 (D. Minn. 1992) (privacy); 
Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(privacy), aff'd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Kamehameba Schools/Bishop Estate, 780 F. 
Supp. 1317, 1320, 1322 (D. Haw. 1991) (religion). It remains uncertain how the lower courts will 
read the cost BFOQ language. 
1ca Even so, if employers face significant enough fetal tort liability, they may elect to take their 
chances, opting for exclusionaxy fetal protection measures despite the odds that lower courts will 
prohibit use of a cost-based BFOQ. See Louise Van Dyck, Comment, The Costs of Fetal Protection, 
23 CoNN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-53 (1991) (discussing potential for heavy tort liability). 
119 See 111 S. Ct at 1210 (White, J., concurring) {referring to the majority's "[erroneous holding] 
that the BFOQ defense is so narrow that it could never justify a sex-specific fetal protection policy''). 
1
" Id. at 1209; see id. at 1210·14 (White, J., concurring). In addressing the cost justification issue, 
Justice Blacknnm cautioned no fewer than three times that "the issue is not before us," "Johnson 
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limitation, Justice Scalia's concurrence, after arguing that costs would 
support a BFOQ, cautioned that "[i]n the present case, . . . Johnson 
Controls has not asserted a cost-based BFOQ."171 These caveats 
make inroads on the majority's ostensibly unequivocal statement that 
fetal protection policies are absolutely banned by Title VII. To the 
extent that the majority's statements are not part of the Court's 
holding, but simply indicators of how the Court would decide the 
question if it were presented, then the statements are probably not 
very good indicators of what decision the Court would reach today. 
The four concurring justices who believed emphatically that costs can 
support a BFOQ remain on the Court, 172 whereas Justice Marshall, 
who joined in the five-justice majority opinion that rejected cost 
factors, has relinquished his seat to Justice Thomas. In the event that 
another such fetal protection policy reaches the Supreme Court, the 
Court has left itself a wide enough berth to uphold the BFOQ defense 
in future cases.173 
C. Ruinous Costs 
As a general rule, employers cannot escape Title VII liability by 
proving that discrimination would be economically expedient. 174 
Controls bas not argued that it faced any costs from tort liability," and "[w]e, of course, are not 
presented with, nor do we decide, a case in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the 
survival ofthe employer's business." !d. at 1208, 1209. Although two of these cautions were made 
more in connection with predictions about preemption than about cost justification BFOQs, the third 
was in connection with "prohibitive," survival-threatening costs. Id. at 1209. 
m Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
m The four concurring justices were Scalia, White, Rehnquist, and Kennedy. 
m See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that result may 
be different in a case with different facts); cf. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 
272, 296 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that when "it is entirely clear that an issue of law is 
not presented by the facts of the case, it is beyond [the Court's]jurisdiction to reach it''). Writers have 
recognized this potential loophole. See Befort, supra note 24, at 53 (recognizing potential for broader 
BFOQ than that described in Johnson Controls decision); Coyle, supra note 163, at 5 (recognizing 
that Johnson Controls left open the possibility of cost BFOQ for fetal protection plans). Understand-
ably, employers may be reluctant to risk violating what is arguably a Supreme Court rule, but there 
may be cases in which deliberate violation of Title VII as construed by the Supreme Court is 
regarded as the lesser of two evils. See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text. 
,,. See Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
1007 (1982). Title VII contains an "anti-cost bias," that generally precludes reliance on cost factors 
to defend discrimination. Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229, 240-46 (1990). In the BFOQ 
context, this anti-cost bias often results in courts' limiting the defense's reach to those situations in 
which a person's sex actually thwarts the individual's actual ability to perfonn the functions of a 
particular job. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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"[R]emedying inequality normally costs money."175 The BFOQ can 
defend fetal protection policies only if employers overcome this anti-cost 
bias and convince the trier of fact that cost factors should, in this context, 
qualify as business essence for purposes of BFOQ analysis.176 The 
controversy that surrounds the cost-BFOQ question makes predictions 
tenuous.177 Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude that there is a 
category of cases in which the BFOQ defense can be predicated upon 
cost factors.178 The more difficult question concerns the breadth of that 
category. 
There is some consensus that Hruinous" costs support the BFOQ 
defense.179 When the Johnson Controls majority argued that costs 
should not support the BFOQ, it expressly reserved the ruinous costs 
issue: "We, of course, are not presented with, nor do we decide, a case 
in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the 
employer's business. We merely reiterate our prior holdings that the 
incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify discrimination against 
them."18° Costs are "ruinous" if they are so steep that they threaten to 
1
" Sirota, supra note 152, at 1054 (quoting EEOC Decision No. 72-1292, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cases (BNA) 845, 851 (1972)). But cf. New York City Transit Autb. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 567, 587, 
590 n.33 (1979) (holding, in an impact case, that a business necessity was established where no other 
inexpensive method of identifying those qualified for the positions); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977) (holding an employer need not acconunodate employee's 
religious beliefs if accommodation would result in substantial costs to employer). 
m Even if employers can make this showing, they need to make the further showing under the 
second prong of the BFOQ that avoidance of such costs can be achieved only by excluding all fertile 
women, all pregnant women, or whatever class of women it is that the particular policy excludes. See 
Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). 
177 Compare Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct at 1204-07 (suggesting no cost BFOQ) with id. at 
1211-12 (White, J., concurring) ("[BFOQ] defense is broad enough to include considerations of cost") 
and id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concuning) (suggesting costs may support a BFOQ defense). 
111 See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. 
m See Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. at 1209; Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388; see also International Union, 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 905 (Posner, J., dissenting) (envisioning a broad 
intetpretation of business essence that would encompass prohibitive costs); cf. Arizona Governing 
Conun. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1098-99 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting prohibitive costs 
may justify discrimination); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (permitting defense of ruinous costs in OSHA context); Brodin, supra note 25, at 
358. (advocating against cost justifications in impact cases except where "the very financial existence 
of the enterprise is at stake"). But cf. Sirota, supra note 152, at 1052 n.164 (arguing against 
prohibitive cost BFOQs because an employer would not be able to prove that hiring both sexes 
caused business to fail and also because allowing ruinous cost BFOQs would prohibit discrimination 
by financially sue~ businesses, but not by marginal businesses). 
•m 111 S. Ct. at 1209. The concurring justices argued that the facts before the Court did not 
present any question of costs, whether ruinous or non-ruinous, and that the Court'sprecedents did not 
resolve the question of whether cost factors can support the BFOQ. Id. at 1210-14 (White, J., 
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destroy the employer's business.181 If the exclusion of some category of 
employees is so important to the business that the costs of including those 
employees will put the employer out of business, then avoiding those 
costs is part of the essence of the business.182 Thus, in the fetal tort 
liability context, infertility among women183 would be a permissible job 
qualification for purposes of the BFOQ defense if potential fetal tort 
liability costs were heavy enough to threaten the viability of the 
business.184 
Although Supreme Court views on ruinous costs as a BFOQ are 
limited primarily to the passing dicta in Johnson Controls, 185 two lower 
court decisions tend to confirm that costs severe enough to threaten the 
viability of a business can support the BFOQ defense.186 In Diaz v. Pan 
concurring); id. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
m The detriment inquiry here is necessarily more hypothetical than it was in the preemption 
context. Preemption analysis focused on the degree to which state law intetfered with federal 
requirements or objectives overall. The focus was on federalism, whereas in BFOQ analysis, the focus 
is on the viability of the individual defendant. The concreteness that preemption analysis required was 
some showing that these kinds of cases have resulted in violations of federal laws or purposes, not 
a showing that the individual defendant has violated the federal law. BFOQ analysis, by contrast, 
measures the extent of detriment the individual employer must experience in order to be able to 
invoke that detriment to support a BFOQ defense. Given that this narrow defense is available only 
if the individual employer meets its requirements, not where employers in the defendant's class tend 
to meet them, the courts should accept threatened, rather than actual detriment. Concrete evidence 
of the scope of detriment to this defendant would be evidence that the employ~ has already gone 
out of business. 
111 See Dkrz, 442 F.2d at 388; Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 299-300 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981). The argument in the text admittedly ignores the first prong of the BFOQ defense, whic:h 
requires the defendant to show that women are incapable ·of petfonning some aspect of the job. 
Perhaps courts would rephrase this prong to require that women be incapable of doing the job 
without ruinous costs being imposed, much as certain safety-BFOQ and privacy-BFOQ cases 
incorporate safety and privacy into the essence of the business. See, e.g., Western Airlines v. 
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 420-21 (1985). 
113 Under the "sex plus" doctrine and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, discrimination against 
only that subset of women who are fertile is nevertheless discrimination against women. See supra 
notes 6, 42-43. 
1u See Carol Docan, Risk and Responsibility: The Working Woman Mak£s the Choice, Not the 
Employer, 38 MEn. TRIAL TECH. Q. 145, 152 (1991) (suggesting that if employers are held strictly 
liable and that threatens survival of business, BFOQ may apply). 
115 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991). Cases in the usually analogous area of age discrimination do 
not offer much assistance on the cost justification issue. Although cases under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA''), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1990)), tend to reject costs as supportive of the ADEA 
defenses, costs play a special role in the ADEA context. ADEA places particular emphasis on 
foibidding employers to impose on aging employees the costs of increased wages, pension benefits, 
and insurance that accompany a worker•s aging. See Terrence P. Collingsworth, Note, The Cost 
Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 580, 581. 
1
" See also Smallwood v. United Airlines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 456 
U.S. 1007 (1982) (arguing that only ruinous costs should support the BFOQ defense). 
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American Ailways, 181 the Fifth Circuit rejected profit loss as a founda-
tion for BFOQ and suggested that the financial costs of complying with 
Title VII could support a BFOQ only if such costs actually kept the 
employer frqm "perfonn[ing] the primary function or service it of-
fers."188 If a cost will keep the employer from doing what it is in 
business to do, then that cost undennines the essence of the business. 
Ruinous costs clearly render nonnal operationS impossible and meet the 
BFOQ requirement. 
Similarly, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 189 the district court recog-
nized that hiring males as flight attendants would harm the defendant's 
image as the "love airline" and would diminish profits accordingly.190 
Nonetheless, the court held that the BFOQ is not available merely 
because the business "goal" of making a profit would be thwarted if men 
were employed.191 The court explained that the defense would be 
available, however, where accomplishment of the very tasks that the 
employer is in business to perfonn would be thwarted.192 If forcing a 
business to hire women has the direct result that the business will be 
entirely ruined, then the business essence must be defined to require the 
tasks for which women are deemed unsuitable.193 
The more difficult question is whether costs that do not threaten 
extinction for the employer may support a BFOQ defense.194 Discussing 
'
11 492 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). 
'" Id. at 389. 
'" 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
•~ Id. at 296, 302 n.25; see Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307; Usezy v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 
F.2d 224, 235 n.26 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 (C.D. Cal. 
1971) (stating that a cost justification cannot support business necessity defense). 
"' Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302 n.25. 
uz Id. at 302-03 (citing Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1162, 1163-64 
(C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981)). The airline alleged that female flight 
attendants' function of being sexually alluring to male passengers was a crucial component of the 
airline's success. Although the court recognized that the airline's growth and prosperity depended in 
large part on the attractive attendants who created a .. love airlines" image, the court ruled that 
transporting passengers, rather than sexual allurement, constituted the essence ofthe airline's business. 
ld. at 302. If, however, the airline could have shown that most passengers would have switched to 
a different airline if the alluring attendants had been removed, and that this would have destroyed the 
business or posed a serious threat to continued operations, this showing likely would have been 
enough to demonstrate that the essence of the business was sexual allurement, rather than transport. 
It would have been the allurement, not simple transportation, that people had been paying for, as 
evidenced by the fact that they stopped paying when the allurement ended. 
113 Wilson exemplified a willingness on the part of courts to decide for themselves what the 
defendant's business is. See 511 F. Supp. at 302. Courts confronted with the prospect of a ruined 
business should perhaps be more ready to accept the defendant's definition of the essence of the 
business. 
'" One writer has suggested that cost factors necessarily come into play under the second prong 
of the BFOQ, where the employer may prevail by showing that it is '"impractical to deal with women 
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the question as a hypothetical matter in Johnson Controls, the justices 
exhibited disagreement.195 The two prior Supreme Court cases relied 
upon in Johnson Controls, moreover, do not necessarily support either 
position. 
D. Dothard and Manhart 
In Johnson Controls, the justices debated the availability of a cost 
justification defense that the defendant never raised.196 Justice Blackmun 
cited Los Angeles v. Manharf97 for the proposition that anticipated costs 
short of extinction of the business cannot support a BFOQ defense. 198 
Justice White relied on Dothard v. Rawlinson199 to support the position 
that cost justifications may provide a proper foundation for the BFOQ 
defense.200 
Manhart challenged an employer's requirement that women contribute 
more to a pension plan than men. 201 The employer defended the result-
ing disparity in take-home pay with the argument that women would 
ultimately live longer, and, therefore, cost the plan more in benefits.202 
The Court accepted the truth of the proposition that "[w]omen as a class, 
do live longer than men," and would receive more benefits than men, as 
a group, would receive.203 Despite this cost justification, the Manhart 
Court concluded that the premium disparity constituted sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII. Manhart, however, was not a BFOQ case. 
Rather, the case concerned whether the plaintiff had made a prima facie 
case of sex discrimination. 204 
on an individual basis."' See Brodin, supra note 25, at 331 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.S (5th Cir. 1969)). 
1
" See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. A good educational program in the workplace 
may avert ruinous tort liability costs in many cases. See Van Dyck, supra note 168, at 1083-86 
(advocating non-preemption decision on the Title VII/fetal tort issue in order to encourage employers 
to implement greater safety mechanisms in the workplace). 
"' The major portion of the Court's BFOQ analysis went to rejecting the safety BFOQ that 
Johnson Controls had offered. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct 1196, 
1204-08 (1991). The Court rejected the safety BFOQ because fetal safety is not an essential element 
of battery manufacture. !d. at 1206. 
36). 
1
., Los Angeles Dept of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
"'·Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct at 1209 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-18, 717 n.32). 
Itt Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
200 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1212 {White, J., concurring) (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-
201 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704. 
202 Id. at 706. 
20, ld. at 707-08. 
204 Id. at 716-17 nn.31-32; see Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1211 (White, J., concurring). But 
see Brodin, supra note 25, at 326 & n.47 (citing CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL 
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Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun's reliance on Manhart for his 
prediction in Johnson Controls that cost factors would not support the 
BFOQ defense was not unreasonable. Justice Stevens's opinion for the 
Court in Manhart does venture from the narrow question before the Court 
of whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case to the broader 
question of cost as a defense generally under Title VII.205 Specifically, 
in response to the Manhart petitioner's argument that cost considerations 
had rebutted the prima facie case, Justice Stevens explained that cost 
arguments could have helped the petitioner only if Title VII had an 
affirmative defense for cost justifications.206 The Manhart opinion's 
dismissal of the petitioner's argument on the ground that Title VII 
contains no "cost justification" defense does not necessarily mean that 
cost must be irrelevant to the available, but far narrower, BFOQ defense. 
Even though the Manhart case is arguably relevant to the BFOQ scenario, 
then, it is also easily distinguishable should the Court choose to 
distinguish it when the issue comes before it,2°7 
In his Johnson Controls concurrence, Justice White relied on Dothard 
v. Rawlinson 208 for the proposition that costs may support a BFOQ de-
fense. 209 In Dothard, the Supreme Court held that the Alabama prison 
system could rely on the BFOQ defense to justify its exclusion of women 
from positions that entailed contact with inmates.210 The Dothard Court 
found that "[a] woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male, 
maximum-security, unclassified penitentiaty of the type Alabama [then 
ran] could be directly reduced by her womanhood."211 Relying on 
Dothard, Justice White's Johnson Controls concurrence argued that "[i]f 
the cost of employing women could not be considered, the [state of 
Alabama in Dothardj should have been required to hire more staff and 
restructure the prison environment rather than exclude women."212 
Although Justice White's reliance on Dothard to support a general 
cost BFOQ is reasonable, Dothard is entirely consistent with the narrower 
view that only costs so severe as to destroy the defendant support a 
BFOQ. While it is true that Dothard recognized a BFOQ where 
SrATUTORY LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 56 (1980)} (suggesting that Manhart decision 
rejected cost as a defense, rather than as a rebuttal to prima facie case of disc:rimination). 
m See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17. 
lOS Id. at 716. 
2lll But see Kaminshine, supra note 174, at 245-46. 
201 433 u.s. 321 (1977}. 
209 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36). 
210 433 U.S. at 337. 
211 Id. at 335. 
212 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1213. 
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expenditure of money might eventually have eliminated the conditions 
requiring exclusion of women, the costs of those improvements would 
have been ruinous. In fact, a federal district court had already ordered the 
state of Alabama to rectifY the prison situation, and the state had been 
unable financially to make the improvements.213 The Dothard decision 
supports a cost-based BFOQ, but only of the type where requiring 
admission of women would have the effect of putting the defendant out 
of business. 
E. Breadth of the Cost BFOQ 
Despite language in Dothard, Manhart, and Johnson Controls, the 
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether costs can support a BFOQ. It 
appears likely that ruinous costs will support such a defense. It remains 
entirely uncertain, and may ultimately depend on the composition of the 
Court, whether costs short of ruinous costs can form a valid foundation 
for the BFOQ defense. The prospect that non-ruinous costs may be 
capable of supporting the BFOQ defense raises the specter that Title VII 
will become a scheme more protective of employer interests than of the 
employee interests it was enacted to safeguard 214 Another problem is 
one of line-drawing: if non-ruinous costs support the BFOQ, how close 
to ruinous must those costs come in order to support a BFOQ?215 
The answer to the question of whether non-ruinous cost can and 
should support a BFOQ turns on what balance is struck between 
employer interests and the public interest in employment equality. This 
balance is, of course, already broadly sketched in the dictates of Title VII. 
The public interest outweighs employer interests in profits to the extent 
that Title VII may be deemed to have an anti-cost basis. On the other 
hand, by making the BFOQ defense available, Congress has tilted the 
balance in favor of employer interests. 
m See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. 
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). 
214 Both sides of the dispute have strong economic interests at stake. The employee has an 
economic interest in gainful employment, the employer in keeping costs down. Arguably, both sides 
face economic ruination. If the balance is struck in favor of the employer, then the employee faces 
unemployment, which may constitute economic demise for the individual. CJ. Los Angeles Dep't of 
Water & Health v. Manhart. 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) (stating the policy behind Title VII focuses 
on fairness to the individual). 
215 If non-ruinous costs can support the BFOQ defense, the problem of line-drawing must be 
addressed. How close to ruinous must the costs be in order to support the defense? If hiring women 
would be so expensive that the employer would have to close down one entire plant, for example, 
would that be a sufficient cost to support the BFOQ? 
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In including the BFOQ in Title VII, Congress clearly showed concern 
that businesses be permitted to continue to accomplish their essential 
objectives, to remain viable, despite the strictures of Title VII. The 
BFOQ, as usually applied, thus permits the employer to exclude those 
whose sex precludes their performing tasks essential to the employer's 
business. In cases recognizing the potential for a ruinous cost BFOQ, 
courts would permit invocation of the BFOQ defense anytime forcing an 
employer to employ an individual (or category of individuals) would 
potentially destroy the business, even though the excluded workers are 
capable of performing the specifics of the job they seek to fill. If they are 
capable of performing the job, but their inclusion in the work force 
threatens the continued existence of the business, then the BFOQ essence 
requirement is met and the defense is available. The reason the BFOQ 
would be available where specific job performance is possible, but 
employment of the individual would otherwise ruin the business, is that 
any factor so important that it can ruin the business must be deemed 
"essence." 
The BFOQ itself, of course, has no ruination qualification. The 
defense is available when the business purposes will be thwarted or at 
least not furthered by employment of the worker in question. Although 
threat of ruination is not a prerequisite to the defense when worker 
performance of the assigned tasks is at issue, it should be a prerequisite 
when employers use the defense to excuse exclusion of people who can 
do the work, but whose inclusion harms the employer financially. To do 
otherwise would wander too far from the narrow defense created by 
Congress. 
As suggested above, it was only by inference that the Court in 
Johnson Controls could conclude that a threat to fmancial viability 
permits invocation of the BFOQ. This was a reasonable inference given 
that the BFOQ "essence" requirement demonstrates that the congressional 
concern underlying the BFOQ defense is business viability. Although the 
Court's extrapolation from this defense to permit exclusion of anyone who 
threatens business viability makes sense, it is merely an extrapolation and 
therefore should be taken no farther than can be supported by the 
rationale for the BFOQ that Congress created. To permit use of the 
defense in situations where the harm threatened to the business falls short 
of ruination would be unfaithful to the congressional intent as manifested 
in the essence requirement. 
When achievement of the public interest in equality can be accom-
plished only at the expense of the employer's viability, then employer 
interests must win. In the fetal tort context, the ruinous cost BFOQ 
should be permitted only if the employer can convince the trier of fact by 
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a preponderance of the evidence that the prospect of tort liability is so 
certain and so large that, in the wake of such liability, the business could 
no longer function. Such a showing should entail evidence that ruinous 
tort liability is more than a mere hypothetical possibility, but is instead 
a concrete likelihood. To draw the line anywhere short of a showing of 
concrete likelihood of ruin would sacrifice the public interest in employ-
ment equality for mere business profits, rather than actual business 
viability. 
Consider the problem that remains at the Johnson Controls plant. 
Assume that Johnson Controls stands to lose substantial profits in the way 
of tort damages for fetal harm because Title VII does not preempt fetal 
tort law, and that Johnson Controls cannot rely on the BFOQ defense to 
exclude women to avert that liability because the costs are not ruinous. 
This could mean that Johnson Controls will now face tort liability for 
fetal harm and that Johnson Controls shareholders will enjoy lower profits 
because of that liability. It could also mean that Johnson Controls will act 
in such a way as to enhance profits. This may include installing 
protective equipment to make the workplace safer than had previously 
been understood as possible, providing better warnings and education to 
employees, providing at-risk female employees with truly comparable 
positions in less hazardous areas of the business, and other safeguards. 
CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the Johnson Controls decision, employers face an 
unappealing choice between violating state law and violating federal law. 
Employers that admit fertile women to the workplace in compliance with 
Johnson Controls face potential state tort liability for fetal harm. In these 
tort suits, employers will seek to avoid liability by arguing that the 
federal law announced in Johnson Controls preempts the state fetal tort 
law. Employers that retain fetal protection policies, on the other hand, 
face the prospect of employment discrimination suits by the excluded 
women. The question for these employers will be whether they can avoid 
Title VII liability by presenting a BFOQ defense predicated on the 
argument that the fetal protection plan is necessary to protect the 
employer from ruinous (or near ruinous) fetal tort liability. 
Despite the Johnson Controls dicta on the preemption question, Title 
VII will not necessarily preempt the fetal tort liability of employers that 
include fertile women in the hazardous workplace. Particularly when there 
is no evidence that the tort laws are effectively causing employers to 
violate Title VII, the tort laws do not present a conflict with the federal 
law that would warrant preemption. Therefore, employers facing the fetal 
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hazard quandary may not have access to the preemption escape route held 
forth by the Johnson Controls majority. 
The BFOQ as an escape device may hold more promise than the 
Johnson Controls majority suggested The justices ruled unanimously 
only that employers cannot predicate the BFOQ defense on altruistic 
interests in fetal health. Despite the majority's language rejecting a cost 
BFOQ, the opinions actually implied that the justices would unanimously 
agree to allow ruinous costs to support the BFOQ defense. They 
discussed when, if ever, costs short of ruinous costs can defend a fetal 
protection plan but did not decide the question since it was not presented 
by the facts of the case. Hence, there should be some group of fetal 
protection cases for which the cost BFOQ is available, but how far that 
group may extend beyond cases of ruinous costs remains Wlclear. 
· In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court discussed two escape routes 
from the employer's fetal hazard quandary. Although the Johnson 
Controls majority predicted that preemption held more promise than the 
BFOQ, there will be cases in which the opposite is true. Some employers 
may fare better if they violate Title VII and invoke the BFOQ than if 
they violate state law and invoke the federal preemption doctrine. 
